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I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-3-102(4), and pursuant to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court dated 
November 17, 2009, transferring this matter to this Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Defendants/Appellees Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook assert 
that the principal issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
Standard for review: Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court "grant[s] no deference to the court below, but instead, 'the district court's 
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for 
correctness.'" Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, ]f 8, 178 P.3d 930 (quotingMassey 
v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,18, 152 P.3d 312). Additionally, in reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Arnold Indus, v. 
Love, 2002 UT 133, f 11, 63 P.3d 721 (quotingDCMInv. Corp. v. PinecrestInv. Co., 
2001UT91,P6,34P.3d785). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Ms. Hampton") 
filed her original complaint against Defendants on August 14, 2007 (R. 1). She 
eventually filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008 (R. 131), bringing 
claims against Defendants for declaratory judgment, (R. 138), breach of contract (R. 
140), breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 141), slander of title (R. 142), 
negligence (R. 143), and fraud (R. 144). The factual allegations in Plaintiffs Third 
Amended Complaint pertain to transactions involving parcels of real property in Carbon 
County, Utah: one parcel of approximately 4,000 acres (R. 134), and one parcel of 
approximately 6.32 acres with a residence (R. 134). Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that she 
owned those parcels together with Kim Jensen (whom she refers to as K.C. Jensen or her 
"Joint Tenant"), but that her name was "fraudulently" removed from the title to the 
properties. (R. 133-138). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Professional Title Services 
and Clay Holbrook assisted Kim Jensen with the transactions wherein Plaintiff lost her 
interest in the properties. (R. 133-138). 
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an oral 
agreement with Clay Holbrook wherein she would "relinquish her rights" in the 6.32 
acres parcel of property by selling that property to Defendants for $21,185.47. (R. 136 at 
Tf 31). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Clay Holbrook refused to finalize the transaction, 
and thereby breached their oral agreement. (R. 13 6-13 8, 140-142). 
Plaintiff was given ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery. The first 
scheduling order was entered on June 13, 2008, providing that fact discovery should be 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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completed by October 31, 2008 (R. 76-77). After Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the 
scheduling order, a second scheduling order was entered on August 11, 2008, providing 
that fact discovery would end on December 2, 2008. (R. 84-86, 92-93). A third 
scheduling order was entered on March 9, 2009, providing that fact discovery should be 
completed by July 10, 2009. (R. 157-158). During the course of discovery, Plaintiff 
served various discovery requests, to which Defendants responded and provided at least 
668 pages of documents pertaining to the underlying transactions. (R. 81-83, 97, 149, 
172, 174, 233). Plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery, she 
served several discovery requests, and in response to such discovery requests she 
received hundreds of pages of documentation pertaining to the real property transactions 
she put at issue in her Third Amended Complaint. 
After the close of fact discovery (pursuant to the deadline in the third amended 
scheduling order), Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (R. 235; see 
also Addendum 1 at p. 29). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, and an affidavit supporting her memorandum. (R. 377-503; see also 
Addendum 7 and 8 at pp. 105-130). She attached several documents to her affidavit, 
most of which had been produced by Defendants. (R. 401-503). However, neither her 
memorandum in opposition nor her affidavit made any attempt to controvert the 
statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Defendants' memorandum. (R. 377-400). A 
hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on September 21, 2009. 
(R. 547; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 131-168). During the hearing, Judge Thomas heard 
oral argument from both parties, and asked Plaintiff several questions regarding her 
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claims and contentions. (R. 547 at pages 13-28; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 135-150)1. 
As a result of the briefs and the hearing, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. The 
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on October 8, 2009, 
granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff s claims. (R. 533-541; see 
also Addendum "A" to the Brief of Appellant). Plaintiff then filed this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Hampton") 
filed a lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the Seventh District Court on November 10, 1999, 
case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). (R. 240, 258-276). 
2. In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens 
against parcels of real property, as follows: 
a. Recorded on November 15, 1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, 
as Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property 
(R. 240, 280-282; see Addendum 2(a) at p. 41); 
b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of 
access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 283-284; see Addendum 
2(b) at p. 44); 
c. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of 
Only the first page of the transcript of the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was marked as 
part of the record, number 547. Therefore, references to the transcript of the summary judgment hearing will refer 
to the number marked as the record, 547, followed by individual pages as identified in the transcript. 
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access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 285-286; see Addendum 
2(c) at p. 46); 
d. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property (R. 
241, 287-289; see Addendum 2(d) at p. 48). 
3. Two of the lis pendens specifically state, "The Petitioner [Ms. Hampton] 
claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being 
the object of the action." (R. 241, 286, 289; see Addendum 2 at pp. 47, 50). 
4. On January 23, 2002, the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Scott N. 
Johansen, entered a stipulated order in the 1999 Suit requiring Ms. Hampton to release 
her lis pendens as to two specific parcels so those parcels could be sold to third parties 
(R. 290-312; see Addendum 3): (1) the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of 
approximately 6.37 acres) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel"); (2) a total of 675 
acres west of Helper, Utah (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel"). (R. 241, 290-293; 
see Addendum 3 at pp. 58-61). 
5. The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to 
remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. (R. 242, 294). 
6. The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and after the 
payment of certain expenses, the proceeds from the sale should be "deposited into an 
interest bearing trust account, set up by counsel for [Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen], 
with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds are to be distributed as the 
Court orders and as the parties might agree." (R. 242, 294 at ]f 8). 
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7. Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and 
escrow agent for the sales of the two parcels. (R. 242, 313-317). 
8. At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel 
was under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at 
HH 4-7). 
9. The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton 
Foy, for aprice of $135,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at Tf|f 4-7). 
10. Defendants had no involvement in the negotiation of the two contracts, but 
was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. (R. 242, 314 at 
17). 
11. The two transactions took approximately two months from when 
Professional Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002. 
During that time period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of 
Professional Title Services, was in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for 
Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the attorney for Tonda Hampton. (R. 242, 314 at ^ f 9). 
12. Before the transactions closed, Holbrook was informed by both Richard 
Golden and Douglas Stowell that the parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the 
sales, and that the parties' agreement would be entered as an order of the Court. (R. 243, 
315 at If 10). 
13. The transactions both closed on January 25, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at f 10, 
318-321). 
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14. The settlement statement from the sale of the House Parcel shows that the 
proceeds from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were 
$42,060.94. (R. 243, 315 at 112, 318). 
15. The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds 
from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. (R. 
243, 315 atH 13, 320). 
16. After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional 
Title Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court. 
(R. 243, 315 at 114). 
17. The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of 
$40,466.15, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to 
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda 
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at If 15, 322). 
18. The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of 
$42,060.94, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to 
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda 
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315-316 at 116, 323). 
19. Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow 
agent, and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title 
Services nor Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services 
nor Clay Holbrook has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the 
attorneys received them, or how the proceeds were distributed. (R. 244, 316 at ^  17). 
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20. On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen 
and Double J. Triangle, LLC, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 
020701072 ("2002 Suit"). (R. 244, 325-328, 363-364; see Addendum 5 at p. 90). 
21. In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against 
many of the same parcels at issue in the 1999 Suit and identified on the lis pendens 
recorded in the 1999 Suit ("2002 Lis Pendens"). (R. 244, 280-289, 329-331; see 
Addendum 2 at page 51). 
22. The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a 
Lis Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent 
[Kim Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, 
Fraudulently." (R. 244, 331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). 
23. On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). (R. 244, 332-
336, 366-367; see Addendum 5 at p. 93). 
24. In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many 
of the same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit ("2003 Lis Pendens"). 
(R. 245, 337-339; see Addendum 2 at p. 54). 
25. On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). (R. 245, 340-
342; see Addendum 4 at p. 65). 
26. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff named Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former 
attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. (R. 245, 340). 
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27. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account" 
was established, referring to the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23, 
2002. (R. 245, 340). Plaintiff also alleged that the "trust account no longer exists." (R. 
245,340). 
28. Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of 
our other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants [sic] True Records will show that 
Petitioner [Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any 
ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." (R. 245, 341; see 
Addendum 4 at p. 67). 
29. In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 Suit, Kim Jensen filed 
a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. (R. 245, 343-372; see Addendum 5). 
30. The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support filed by Kim Jensen in 
the 2004 Suit asserted the defense of res judicata and set forth the history of Plaintiff s 
various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. (R. 245, 345-347). The memorandum 
contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been destroyed by the 
Seventh Judicial District Court (R. 245-246): 
a. Exhibit I to the memorandum is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for 
the 1999 Case, holding that Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a 
common law marriage, dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and 
ordering the lis pendens filed by Tonda Hampton against all real property to 
be released (R. 246, 352-361; see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89); 
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b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the 
real property should be divided (R. 246, 362-364; see Addendum 5 at pp. 
90-92); 
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had 
"sold and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse 
ownership" of the real property and other assets (R. 246, 365-367; see 
Addendum 5 at pp. 93-95); 
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were 
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real 
property, and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released. (R. 
246, 368-372; see Addendum 5 at pp. 96-99). 
31. In response to the motion to dismiss filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit, 
the Seventh Judicial District Court granted the motion and entered an order on September 
13, 2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that the 2004 Suit was barred due to the 
doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). (R. 246, 373-376; see Addendum 6). 
32. Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. (R. 
1, 246). Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing 
allegations regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, 
the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit. (R. 131-148, 246-247) Plaintiffs requested relief asks 
for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real property titled in plaintiffs name and to 
the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be shown as Discovery unfolds; [b] 
injunction for Defendants to correct all mistakes concerning all real estate interests, water 
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rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is willing to be 
compensated at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs interest 
have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds." (Id.) 
33. In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with 
questions regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. (R. 
247,316). 
34. In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff 
to resolve all claims and prepared a proposed settlement agreement. (R. 247, 316, 658). 
35. Ms. Hampton did not agree to the proposed settlement agreement as 
prepared by Mr. Holbrook, but instead stated that she would only accept the amount 
offered by Mr. Holbrook as payment for the House Parcel, and that she intended to 
pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. (R. 247, 316). 
36. In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she entered into an 
agreement with Defendants whereby Defendants would purchase her interest in the 
House Parcel. (R. 136 at 131). 
37. During the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiff stated that the intent of the 
alleged oral agreement was for Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel: 
THE COURT: Okay. What were the terms, do you believe? 
MS. HAMPTON: The terms were to—I would relinquish my 
rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed up, everything 
was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in that August 27th disclaimer, I 
believe would be correct, to my belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer. 
Those are the terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title 
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47. 
(R. 547 at page 22; see Addendum 9 at p. 144). 
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THE COURT: —there is a reasonable basis to find there is a 
disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral contract. And—and I'm 
looking to see what you believed the terms of the oral contract were and 
where that—where that document is—why you believe those terms are 
accurate, the basis for what you believe those terms are. 
MS. HAMPTON: The basis, he agreed to pay the money to 
relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the company erred in. I 
don't believe I have the—a document to show that at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, there's no document that shows what the 
terms of that agreement were; is that correct? 
MS. HAMPTON: Not at this time— 
(R. 547 at page 23; see Addendum 9 at p. 145). 
THE COURT: Yeah. In other words, the terms of a contract would 
be, you know, the~the things that go to the heart of the agreement. In other 
words, there would be a payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand 
some-odd dollars in exchange for what? What—what-what were the terms 
of the-of the oral agreement from your perspective? 
MS. HAMPTON: He would pay me the $21,185.47 to relinquish my 
rights to a deed of 6.32 acres. That was a discussion and an agreement we 
came to. 
THE COURT: So, it was~it was totally to relinquish rights to a 
deed? That's all it was? 
MS. HAMPTON: To relinquish my rights to a deed, one deed of 
6.32 acres. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, essentially, your oral agreement was the 
payment would be made to relinquish the rights in land. Is that what you're-
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: -is that what you're telling me? 
MS. HAMPTON: It was land, real property. 
THE COURT: So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it was not in the 
nature of a settlement agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. 
THE COURT: It was not in the nature of a settlement agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. The~ 
THE COURT: But rather was for payment for an interest in land. Is 
that what you're asserting? I want to make sure I understand this, ma'am. 
MS. HAMPTON: Correct. 
(R. 547 at pages 24-25; see Addendum 9 at pp. 146-147). 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment raised several legal 
theories, there is only one issue relevant to this appeal: whether the trial court properly 
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants assert that the trial court 
properly granted the motion. 
First, the undisputed facts as presented by Defendants were not controverted by 
Plaintiff. The affidavit and documents presented by Plaintiff in her memorandum in 
opposition did not have any information sufficient to raise issues of fact. In her appellate 
brief, Plaintiff makes various arguments that the trial court did not allow her to present 
evidence. However, this matter was decided on summary judgment so Plaintiff had every 
opportunity to present evidence in her briefings and at the hearing on Defendants' 
motion. Plaintiff conducted significant discovery, but the documents and information 
presented in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment failed to create 
issues of fact. Accordingly, the facts presented by Defendants were undisputed by 
Plaintiff. 
Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff has filed several 
lawsuits pertaining to her ownership interest in the real properties at issue in this matter. 
Plaintiff brought the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit against 
Kim Jensen alleging that Plaintiff owned interests in real property, and that Kim Jensen 
had "fraudulently" removed Plaintiffs name from the title to the properties. In those 
lawsuits, Plaintiff filed lis pendens against the same real property that is at issue in this 
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matter. The undisputed facts demonstrate that all of those cases were resolved against 
Plaintiff, with the trial courts ordering Plaintiff to release the lis pendens, and ruling that 
Plaintiff had no interest in those properties. Plaintiff brought this matter naming 
Defendants as parties rather than Kim Jensen, but her allegations are the same as the 
other lawsuits. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata. 
Third, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not file her 
complaint against Defendants until August 14, 2007. However, Plaintiff was aware of 
the facts and circumstances pertaining to her allegations beginning as early as the 1999 
Suit. Defendants acted as closing agent for the transaction that took place in January, 
2002. After the transaction closed, Defendants wrote a check to the attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Kim Jensen for the amount of the final proceeds resulting from the transaction. After 
that point, Defendants had no further involvement. Plaintiff then brought lawsuits in 
2002, 2003, and 2004, raising the same allegations that have been brought in this matter. 
Therefore, it is apparent that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
underlying her allegations, and the statute of limitations on her claims ran well before 
August, 2007, when she filed her action against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs claims of an oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds. 
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the alleged oral agreement was 
intended to "relinquish [her] rights" in the House Parcel. At the hearing on Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff clarified that the oral agreement was for 
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Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, yet she also admitted that there 
was no written agreement, and she presented no signed, written agreement together with 
her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, because 
Plaintiff has asserted an oral agreement for the purchase of an interest in real property, 
her claims based upon the alleged oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds. 
VI. ARGUMENT - THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as 
Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants' statements of fact, and the undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts of 
the case and the law are clear that Plaintiffs' claims are barred due to res judicata, the 
statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds. 
A, Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of 
facts 
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. "When the moving party has 
presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party 
fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine 
issue of fact is present or would be at trial." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ]f 40, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Finally, "An affidavit that merely reflects the 
affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of 
fact." Id, at \ 50 (quoting Dairy Prod, Servs, v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81 at \ 54, 13 
P.3d581). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that in opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, "[f]or each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party 
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to 
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P.. 
Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
failed to controvert any of Defendants' statements of fact. (R. 377-400; see Addendum 7 
and 8 at pp. 105-130). In opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff did not respond to any 
of Defendants' facts, but instead, she only discussed unsubstantiated allegations. 
Although Plaintiff identifies documents that supposedly support her allegations, there is 
no indication in any of the documents provided by Plaintiff that she disputed any facts 
raised by Defendants. The issues presented by Defendants pertained to res judicata and 
the statutes of limitations. The facts (or allegations) raised by Plaintiff were not relevant 
to the issues raised by Defendants, and would have no bearing on the decision by the 
Court. Therefore, Defendants' statement of facts were undisputed by Plaintiff. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff summarily asserts that "the evidence does not 
support the court's ruling that [of] res judicata," and the "court improperly prevented 
Plaintiffs evidence of fraud issues." See Brief of Appellant at page 12, items LA. and 
ID. In another part of her brief, Plaintiff states, "Had the court simply allowed Plaintiff 
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to introduce her evidence to this case [sic] would have clearly been in Plaintiffs [sic] 
favor and exposed Defendants' misleading intent." See Brief of Appellant at page 10. 
However, Plaintiff makes those statements without providing any supporting arguments 
or citations to the record. She does not indicate what evidence she was prevented from 
introducing, or even what evidence supports her allegations of fraud. 
The proceeding below was a motion for summary judgment. The record 
demonstrates that Plaintiff conducted significant discovery and Defendants produced 
hundreds of pages of documents in response to Plaintiffs discovery. Defendants brought 
a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff had every opportunity to present her 
evidence in her briefings in opposition to Defendants' motion and at the hearing. 
Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts as presented in their motion for 
summary judgment, so it was appropriate for the trial court to make a ruling as a matter 
of law as to the issues presented by Defendants. 
B, The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of res judicata 
Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, \ 14, 82 P.3d 
198. "[Cjlaim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim 
that has been fully litigated previously," and involves three elements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Id. at U 15 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, If 34, 73 P.3d 325). 
Defendants recognize that they were not parties to the previous suits filed by Tonda 
Hampton, so claim preclusion would not be applicable. However, the doctrine of issue 
preclusion does bar Plaintiffs claims. 
Issue preclusion "arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in 
the first suit." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13,1f 35, 73 P.3d 325 (quoting 
Maoris & Assocs.f Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^ 19, 16 P.3d 1214). Issue 
preclusion requires four elements: 
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a 
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Id. (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, f 12, 52 P.3d 1267). 
Plaintiff filed four separate and distinct lawsuits for the purpose of adjudicating title to 
the properties at question in this suit: the 1999 Suit {see supra Section IV. Statement of 
the Facts (hereafter "Facts" or "Fact") 1-5, 30(a)), the 2002 Suit {see Facts 20-22, 30(b, 
d); see Addendum 5 at p. 90), the 2003 Suit {see Facts 23-24, 30(c-d); see Addendum 5 at 
p. 93), and the 2004 Suit {see Facts 25-31; see Addendum 5 at p. 65). Therefore, the first 
element is met, as Plaintiff was the same party in the prior suits. 
In each of the aforementioned suits, Plaintiff brought claims asserting her interest 
in the real properties at issue in this case. See id. Specifically, Plaintiff filed lis pendens 
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in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, and the 2003 Suit. See id.; see also Addendum 2. The 
issues in this case are identical to the issues in the prior cases: Plaintiff is asserting that 
she has a right in or title to various parcels of real property. Although in the prior cases 
she was asserting the claim against a different party, it is evident that she lost those cases, 
and so is trying to find a new party against whom to bring her grievances. However, the 
issues are identical, so the second element of issue preclusion is met. 
The previous suits were completely, fairly, and fully litigated. The dockets and 
the pleadings of the prior cases demonstrate that Plaintiff was represented by various 
attorneys, filed several motions, and had every opportunity to present her case to the 
Court. See generally Facts 1-6, 20-31. 
Finally, the previous suits resulted in final judgments on the merits. The first was 
the Stipulated Order from the 1999 Suit entered on January 23, 2002. See Fact 4; see 
Addendum 3. In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered, that the 
properties would be sold and the proceeds would be put in escrow. See Facts 4-6. 
Defendant Professional Title Services was retained to conduct the closing, and on 
January 29, 2002, Defendant transmitted the proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen 
and Tonda Hampton. See Facts 7-19. Accordingly, Defendants complied with their 
obligations, and the proceeds were distributed directly to Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs 
remaining claims to the other parcels of property were dismissed by a final order of the 
Court, wherein the Court found that Plaintiff and Kim Jensen did not have a common law 
marriage, and therefore ordered the lis pendens filed in the 1999 Suit to be released. See 
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Fact No. 30(a); see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims in the 1999 
Suit were fully adjudicated. 
The claims in the other suits were also fully adjudicated. The 2002 Suit and the 
2003 Suit ended with a final order of the Court dismissing Plaintiffs property claims and 
ordering the lis pendens to be released. See Fact 30(d); see Addendum 5 at p. 96. The 
2004 Suit also resulted in a final order on the merits, once again dismissing Plaintiffs 
claims wherein she asserted an interest in the property through a partnership agreement. 
See Fact 31; see Addendum 6 at p. 100. Accordingly, the fourth element of issue 
preclusion is met, as Plaintiffs claims in the prior suits all resulted in final judgments on 
the merits. 
Plaintiff has already attempted, multiple times, to claim an interest in the real 
properties that are the subject of this suit. Each time, a judgment was entered against 
Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs claims were dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs suits against Kim 
Jensen have failed, and she has sued these Defendants to attempt to find a party to pay 
her for property that the Seventh District Court has already declared never belonged to 
her. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims have already been fully litigated in previous suits, 
and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the 
ground that Plaintiffs claims are barred due to the doctrine of res judicata. 
C. The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of the statute of limitations 
Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint brings causes of action for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, slander 
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of title, negligence, and fraud. The statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years 
from the discovery of the fraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3). The statute of 
limitation is four years for all other claims raised by Plaintiff. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-307 ("An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law."). 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff filed suit against Kim Jensen on 
November 10, 1999, and recorded a lis pendens against the parcels of real property at 
issue in this matter as early as November 15, 1999. See Facts 1-3. The properties at 
issue were sold on January 25, 2002 (with Defendants acting as the closing agent for that 
transaction), and Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale to counsel for Plaintiff 
on January 29, 2002. See Facts 6-18. Accordingly, Plaintiff or her counsel were 
involved in litigation asserting an interest in title to the parcels of real property, and when 
they were sold, the proceeds were distributed to Plaintiffs attorney on January 29, 2002. 
Therefore, any cause of action regarding title to the real properties, and Defendants' 
involvement in the sale of those properties, began to run at the latest on January 29, 2002. 
Because the statute of limitations on all actions other than fraud is 4 years, (and the 
statute of limitations for fraud is only 3 years), the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs 
claims expired in January, 2006. Plaintiff did not file her initial complaint in this matter 
until August, 2007. See Fact 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed her complaint after the 
statute of limitations had run, and Plaintiffs claims are barred. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff has argued that the "fraudulent concealment" 
doctrine prevented the running and expiration of the statutes of limitations. See Brief of 
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Appellant at 11-13. As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run "upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25,114, 156 P.3d 806 (quoting Russell Packard Dev., 
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^  20, 108 P.3d 741). An exception to that general rule is the 
discovery rule, which operates to toll a statute of limitation "until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. at ^ j 15 (quoting Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^  21, 
108 P.3d 741). The discovery rule only applies if "provided for by statute (the 'statutory 
discovery rule')" or "when required by equity (the 'equitable discovery rule')." Id. The 
equitable discovery rule may be applied "when either exceptional circumstances or the 
defendant's fraudulent concealment prevents the plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id. 
In the Colosimo case, the Supreme Court clarified the knowledge requirement in 
the context of the discovery rule: 
A plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his action when he has 
actual knowledge of the fraud "or by reasonable diligence and inquiry 
should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him." We 
have particularly emphasized the importance of the diligence requirement, 
stating that "[a] party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting 
the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of 
knowledge" and that "[a] party is required to make inquiry if his findings 
would prompt further investigation." In other words, if a party has 
knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably 
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will 
run. 
Id. at 1| 17 (quoting Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993)). In this case, it 
is not necessary to discuss whether the statutory discovery rule or the equitable discovery 
rule apply, because the allegations and pleadings filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the 
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2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff had 
knowledge of the facts underlying the alleged fraud when she filed those suits. 
In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff executed and caused to be recorded a 
lis pendens on December 19, 2002. See Fact 21 (R. 329-331; see Addendum 2 at p. 51). 
On the 2002 lis pendens, Plaintiff states, "During this case, a Lis Pendens need [sic] to be 
in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim Jensen] has been 
depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." Fact 22 (R. 
331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). Therefore, as early as December 19, 2002, Plaintiff 
asserted that properties were being fraudulently transferred out of her name. Those are 
the same allegations, and pertain to the same parcels of property, that are at issue in this 
matter. The facts also demonstrate that Plaintiff raised those same issues in the 2003 Suit 
and the 2004 Suit. See Facts 23-31. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts 
underlying the alleged fraud as early as December 19, 2002, and the statute of limitations 
on all claims began to run at that time by at least that time (if not before), expiring well 
before August, 2007, when Plaintiff brought her complaint against Defendants. 
Therefore, because Plaintiff did not file her complaint against Defendants until August, 
2007, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of 
the statute of limitations. 
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D, The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of the alleged oral 
agreement 
In her Third Amended Complaint, and at the hearing on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the terms of the alleged oral agreement 
provided that Defendants would pay a sum of money to Plaintiff, in exchange for which 
Plaintiff would convey her interest in the House Parcel to Defendants. See Facts 33-37. 
An oral agreement for an interest in land is barred by the statute of frauds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing. 
Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement clearly falls within the statute of frauds. 
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel. An 
agreement of that nature is clearly an agreement for the purchase of an "interest in real 
property." Accordingly, because there is no writing, the agreement is barred pursuant to 
the statute of frauds, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of Plaintiff s oral agreement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Defendants assert that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants for the following reasons: 
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(A) Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts; the documents and 
arguments presented by Plaintiff in her opposition did not create a material issue of fact, 
pertaining to res judicata, the statute of limitations, or the statute of frauds; because the 
proceeding before the trial court was a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff had every 
opportunity to present evidence in opposition to Defendants' motion, therefore her 
arguments that the trial judge "prevented testimony" is not correct; 
(B) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiff 
brought several suits (in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004), asserting that she had wrongfully 
lost her interests in real property, and all those cases were decided on the merits against 
Plaintiff, so her claims are barred pursuant to res judicata; 
(C) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitations; the previous suits 
filed by Plaintiff demonstrate that she had knowledge of the facts underlying her 
allegations in this action as early as December, 2002, so the statute of limitations ran by 
at least December, 2006, long before Plaintiffs complaint was filed in August, 2007; 
(D) Plaintiffs allegation of an oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds; 
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants had agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, 
and such a verbal agreement for the purchase of an interest in land is clearly barred by the 
statute of frauds. 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
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Dated this 13th day of April, 2010 
HIRSCHI STEELE & BAER, PLLC 
/s/ Justin R. Baer 
Justin R. Baer 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of April, 2010,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF to be mailed via First Class U.S. Mail, to 
the following: 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
P.O. Box 586 
Price, UT 84501 
/s/ Justin R. Baer 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, etal., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 070700813 
Judge: Douglas B. Thomas 
Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook, by and through their 
attorneys, pursuant to Rule 7 U.R.C.P., hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has brought this matter asserting mat she should be compensated for the alleged 
loss of real property. She asserts that Defendants were involved in the transfers of the property 
out of her name, and that Defendants are therefore liable for fraud, negligence, slander of title, 
l 
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and other causes of action. However, the facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff has already 
adjudicated the status of the title to the real property at issue, and this Court has already decided 
this issue against Plaintiff. 
In 1999, Plaintiff sued Kim Jensen, asserting that a common law marriage existed. In 
conjunction with the lawsuit, Plaintiff filed various lis pendens and amended lis pendens against 
more than 4,000 acres of real property, many of which Plaintiff has asserted are now at issue in 
this case. In the course of the lawsuit filed in 1999, Plaintiff and Kim Jensen were ordered to sell 
multiple parcels of the property at issue. Defendants were retained to act as closing and escrow 
agent for the transactions. At the completion of the transactions, Defendants transmitted the 
proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen and for Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants fulfilled their 
duties, and the facts clearly demonstrate that Defendants provided the funds from the 
transactions to Plaintiffs counsel, jointly with the counsel for Kim Jensen. 
Ultimately, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs 1999 lawsuit, finding that a common law 
marriage did not exist, and the Court ordered Plaintiff to release the lis pendens that had been 
filed. However, that did not satisfy Plaintiff, and she filed another lawsuit in 2002, and a third 
lawsuit in 2003. In conjunction with both suits, she filed more lis pendens, asserting that she was 
entitled to title of the real property at issue. Those two cases were consolidated, and in a ruling 
in April, 2003, this Court entered another order dismissing Plaintiffs claims, and ordering the lis 
pendens to be released. However, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in 2004, which was also 
dismissed by this Court. 
000231 
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Having had all her complaints against Kim Jensen dismissed, Plaintiff has now filed this 
action against these Defendants, but her causes of action have not changed. She continues to 
assert that she is entitled to ownership of the parcels of real property that were at issue in the 
previous suits. The facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff has wrongfully abused the 
judicial process, and not only should her complaint be dismissed, but the Court should award 
these Defendants their attorney's fees for Plaintiffs bad faith in bringing this action. 
H. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
For the purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only, Defendant asserts 
that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Kim C. Jensen in this Court on November 10, 
1999, case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). The docket is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. Although Defendants have attempted to obtain copies of the pleadings in the 1999 
Suit, Plaintiff does not have copies and the Court has destroyed its file. See Plaintiffs Responses 
to Defendants' Requests for Production, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3. In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens against 
parcels of real property, as follows: 
a. Recorded on November 15,1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property, attached 
hereto as Exhibit C; 
in 000240 
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b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry 
No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of access, 
grazing rights, and water rights, attached hereto as Exhibit D; 
c. Recorded on March 31,2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry 
No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of access, 
grazing rights, and water rights, attached hereto as Exhibit E; 
d. Recorded on March 31,2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry 
No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property, attached hereto 
as Exhibit F. 
4. The lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F appear to be amendments to those lis 
pendens attached hereto as Exhibits D and C, respectively. Compare Exhibits C, D, E, and F. 
5. The lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F specifically state, "The Petitioner 
claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being the object 
of the action." See Exhibit E at page 2; see also Exhibit F at page 3. 
6. In a Stipulated Order of this Court dated January 23, 2002, entered on that date in 
the 1999 Suit, the Court ordered that the lis pendens be released as to two separate parcels: (1) 
the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of approximately 6.37 acres (also identified as 
Parcel No. 9 on the lis pendens attached as Exhibit F) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel"); 
(2) a total of 675 acres west of Helper, Utah (also identified as Parcel No. 10 and portions of 
Parcel No. 8 on the lis pendens attached as Exhibit F) (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel."). 
See Stipulated Order, attached hereto as Exhibit G, at pages 3 to 4. 
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7. The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to remain 
in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. See Stipulated Order (Exhibit G) at page 
5. 
8. The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and that the 
proceeds from the sale be deposited into an interest bearing trust account, set up by the attorneys 
for Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen, which funds were to be distributed by further order from 
the Court or as the parties might agree. See Stipulated Order (Exhibit G) at 5,1f 8. 
9. Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and escrow 
agent for the sales of the two parcels. See Affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook ("Holbrook Aff"), 
attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
10. At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel was 
under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. Id. 
11. The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy, for 
a price of $135,000.00. Id. 
12. Professional Title Services had no involvement in the negotiation of the two 
contracts, but was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. Id. 
13. The two transactions took approximately two months from when Professional 
Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002. During that time 
period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of Professional Title Services, was 
in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the 
attorney for Tonda Hampton. Id. 
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14. Holbrook was informed by both Richard Golden and Douglas Stowell that the 
parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the sales, and that the parties' agreement would 
be entered as an order of the Court. Id. 
15. The transactions both closed on January 25,2002. The settlement statement for 
the House Parcel is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 1. The settlement statement for 
the Vacant Parcel is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 2. 
16. The settlement statement for the House Parcel shows that the proceeds from the 
sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $42,060.94. See Holbrook Aff. at 
Exhibit 1. 
17. The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds from the 
sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. See id at Exhibit 2. 
18. After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional Title 
Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court. Id. 
19. The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of $40,466.15, 
were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to Richard R. Golden and 
Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda Hampton, dated January 29,2002. A 
copy of the check from the bank is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 3. 
20. The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of $42,060.94, 
were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to Richard R. Golden and 
Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda Hampton, dated January 29,2002. A 
copy of the check from the bank is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 4. 
vi 000243 
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21. Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow agent, 
and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title Services nor 
Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services nor Clay Holbrook 
has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the attorneys received them, or how 
the proceeds were distributed. See Holbrook Aff. 
22. On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen and 
Double J. Triangle, LLC in this Court, case number 020701072 ("2002 Suit"). See Docket, 
attached hereto as Exhibit I. 
23. Although Defendants have attempted to obtain copies of the pleadings filed in the 
2002 Suit, Plaintiff does not have copies and the Court has destroyed its file. See Plaintiffs 
Responses to Defendants' Requests for Production, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
24. In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against many of 
the same parcels identified on the lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F ("2002 Lis Pendens"). 
A copy of the 2002 Lis Pendens is attached hereto as Exhibit J. 
25. The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a Lis 
Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim 
Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." See 
Exhibit J at 3. 
26. On January 6,2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in this 
Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). A copy of the docket is attached hereto as Exhibit 
K. 
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27. In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many of the 
same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit. A copy of the 2003 Lis Pendens is 
attached hereto as Exhibit L. 
28. On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in this 
Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). A copy of Plaintiff s Complaint is attached 
hereto as Exhibit M. 
29. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff names Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former 
attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. See Exhibit M. 
30. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account" was 
established, and cited the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23, 2002 (which 
Stipulated Order is attached hereto as Exhibit G). See Exhibit M at f 4., Plaintiff also alleged 
that the "trust account no longer exists." Id. at f 6. 
31. Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of our 
other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants True Records will show that Petitioner 
[Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any ownership change 
on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." Id. at fflf 8-10. 
32. In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 suit, Kim Jensen filed a 
motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. The motion and memorandum, along with all 
attachments, are attached hereto as Exhibit N. 
33. The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support asserted the defense of res 
judicata, and set forth the history of Plaintiff s various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. See 
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Exhibit N. The memorandum contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been 
destroyed by the Court: 
a. Exhibit I is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for the 1999 Case, holding that 
Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a common law marriage, 
dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and ordering the lis pendens filed by 
Tonda Hampton against all real property to be released; 
b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the real 
property should be divided; 
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had "sold 
and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse ownership" of the real 
property and other assets; 
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were 
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real property, 
and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released. 
34, In response to the motion to dismiss of the 2004 Suit, the Court granted the 
motion, and entered an order on September 13,2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that 
the 2004 Suit was barred due to the doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). The 2004 Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit O. 
35. Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. See case 
docket. Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing allegations 
regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and 
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the 2004 Suit. Plaintiffs requested relief asks for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real 
property titled in plaintiff name and to the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be 
shown as Discovery unfolds; [b] injunction for Defendants' to correct all mistakes concerning all 
real estate interest, water rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is 
willing to be compensate at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs 
interest have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds," See 
Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint at 13. 
36. ' In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with, questions 
regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. After some written 
and verbal correspondence with Ms. Hampton, Mr. Holbrook learned of the complaint that had 
been filed in this matter in August, 2007. See Holbrook Aff. 
37. In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff to 
resolve all claims, and prepared a proposed settlement agreement, a copy of which is attached to 
Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 5. 
38. Although the settlement offer was intended to resolve all claims, Ms. Hampton 
stated that she would only accept that amount as payment for the House Parcel, and that she 
intended to pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. See Holbrook Aff. 
39. Because Ms. Hampton would not accept the offer as full resolution of all claims 
in this suit, the settlement was not completed. See Holbrook Aff. 
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L.L.—/»* BTT1 
JOHN E SCHINDLER [3619] 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX (435) 637-5269 
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SHRHWHURHJCX ~ COUNTY OF CflRBON 
1939 NOV 15 1S:56 PK FEE *52,00 BY 
REOEST: S C H I N D L E R ^ E 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIM C. JENSEN, 
Respondent j 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No.: 994700340 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10th day of November, 1999, suit 
was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of LJtah, involving the 
above-named parties and the real properties'described below, situated in Carbon County, 
State of Utah: 
Parcel No. 1, SN - 2A0807-001 (40 acres): 
SE1/4 SE 1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, RBE.SLM. 
Parcel No. 2 - SN --2A-0826 (80 acres) 
SE4NE4, NE4NE4 OF'SEC 11, T135, R8E, SLM 
Parcel No. 3 - SN 2A-0827 (200 acres): 
N 1/2 SW1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, SW1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NW 
1/4fSEC12,T13S,R8ElSLM 
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Parcel No. 4 - SN 2A -0831 {428.31 acres): 
S2S2, N2N2, NE4SE4, N 990 FT OF SE4NE4, SW4NW4 OF 
SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLM. LESS 1.69 AC FOR RR R/W 
Parcel No. 5 - SN 2A-0807 (480.29 acres): 
NW4 & S2 OF SEC 1, T13S, RBE, SLM. 
Parcel No. 6- SN 2A-080B (639.90 Acres): 
ALL OF SEC 3, T13S, R8E, SLM 
Parcel No. 7 - SN 2A-0809 (200 acres): 
SE4, SE4NE4 OF SEC 4, T13S, R8E, SLM. 
Parcel No. 8 - SN 2A-1036 (543.47 acres)r 
1. LOTS 1,2, 3, 4; E2W2; W2NE4;SE4 OF SEC 7, T13S, R9E 
2. SLM. ALSO, BEG 875 FT N & 825 FT W OF SE COR OF LOT 
3. 2,N39*30'W70FT;N40*E75FT;S39*30'E70FT;S40*W 
4. 75FTTOBEG. LESS 58 FT X 71 FT. LESS D&RG R/W 
5. LESS, BEG 460 FT E OF SW COR OF SEC; N 78* 268.4 FT; N 
6. 12*W278FT;S85*W95FT;STOPT115.2FTNOFSL!NE; 
7. S 78* W 127.5 FT; S 12* E 90 FT TO BEG. LESS PARCELS 
8. DESCINQCDBK15 PG 827-10. 638, Less 21-1-36-1 (6.32 
ac) 
Parcel No. 9 - SN 2A-1036-01 (6,32 acres): 
1. BEG 250 FT N OF SE COR OF SW4NE4 OF SEC 7, T13S, 
2. R9E, SLB&M;N 550 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT M/L TO N'LY 
3. LINE OF D&RGW RR R/W; FLY ALG. N'LY R/W 325 FT 
4. M/L TO PT LYING W 220 FT M/L FROM PT OF BEG; E 
5. 220 FT M/L TO PT OF BEG. 
Parcel No. 10 - SN 2A-1060-D02 (428.96 acres): 
' LOTS1,2,3&4;E2SW4;E2NW4;W2NE4;NW4SE4 0F 
SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&H. LESS RR R/W 
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Parcel No. 11-SN2A-1057-002 (40 acres): 
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM 
Parcel No. 12 - SN 2A-1031-004 (344.91 acres): 
1 LOTS5l6l7,E2SW4,SW4SE4 0FSEC6,T13S,R9E, 
2. SLB&H. ALSO, THOSE PORTIONS OF SE4SE4, NE4SE4, 
3. SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SW1Y OF FOLLOWING 
4. BNDRY LINE BEG AT APT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE 
5. COR OF SE4SE4 & SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON A 
6. LINE INTERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION 
7. BNDRYS THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE 
8. OFSE4NW4. 
Parcel No. 13 - SN 2A-0310 (485.12 acres): 
S % OF N 1/2; N % OF S 1/2; LOTS 1,2,3, 4; SEC 35, T12S, 
R8E, SLM 
Parcel No. 14 - SN 2A-307 (161.33 Acres): 
LOTS 1,2; N % OF SE 1/4, SEC 34, T12S, RSE SLM 
DATED this / 5 day of /i/ffV 1999. 
Jp>*N E. SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
myHe»Ueft»nTQftda\UftPeneJw\mo 
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J0HNE.SCH1NDLER[3619] 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269. 
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SfiRON WRDOGK - COUNTY OF CflHBGN 
2000 F B M 13:01 PK F E $19.00 J V 
SEOJE5T: SflMUEL CHIflSft 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIM C.JENSEN, 
Respondent. 
.'; 
"' US PENDENS 
| Civil No.: 994700340 
Judge: Bruce K. Haliiday 
', 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10th day of November, 1899, suit 
was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of .Utah, involving the 
above-named parties and the real properties described below, situated in Carbon County, 
State of Utah: 
Parcel No. 1, 00061313 Bk00392Pg00787-00787 
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, salt Lake Base and 
Meridian: 
* / .
 (*7 Section 12: SE1/4 NW1/4; SW1/4 NE1/4; N % SW1/4; NW 
" 1/4 SE 1/4 
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazing rights, or any 
other rights which may be associated with or appurtenan.t to 
said tends. 
Page 1 of 2 
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TOGETHER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or 
in use on, said lands, including, but noUimited to, water rights 
no. 91-3887 and 91-3643. 
SUBJECT to current general taxes, reservations, restrictions 
and easements existing or of record. 
GRANTORS WARRANT that there has been no conveyance 
or granting by them of any rights of access or ingress and 
egress across, or associated with, said lands. 
Parcel No. 2 - 00061-314 Bk00392 Pg00788-00788 
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian: 
Section 12: SE 1/4 NW1/4; SW1/4 NE 1/4; N % SW1/4; 
NW1/4SE1/4 
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazing rights, or any 
other rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to 
said lands. 
TOGETHER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or 
* in use on, said lands, including, but not limited to, water rights 
• no. 91-328, 91-29, 91.-3887, 91-3690, 91-3543 and 91-107; 
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements 
thereon*and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges 
and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter' used or 
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof. • 
DATED this 3. . day-of 
ilQHHE. SCHINDLER • 
' Forney for Petitioner 
myfiies\JensenTortda\LfsPendens 3 
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Samuel P. Chiara #7829 
Attorney at Law 
98 North 400 East 
P.O. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-7011 
Fax: (435)636-0138 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Fee: 14.00 Check 
SHARON MJRD0CK, Recorder 
Fi led By JB 
For SAMUEL P CHIARA 
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KM C. JENSEN, 
Respondent 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No.: 994700340 
Judge: Scott N.Jbhansen 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10* day of November, 1999, 
suit was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of Utah, involving the 
•above-named parties and the real properties described below, situated hi Carbon County, 
State of Utah: 
Parcel No. 1: 00061313 Bk00392 Pg00787-00787 
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
^ " Section 12: SE HNW lA; SW l/*NE fc;N fc SW V<; NW V. SE VA 
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazing rights, or any other 
rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to said lands. 
TOGETHER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or in 
use on, said lands, including, but not limited to, water rights no. 
91-3387 and 91-3643. . 
*• sr sw-r-nrrrs 
46 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
! . . . . . ( J 
462 
SUBJECT to current general taxes, reservations, restrictions and 
easements existing or of record. 
GRANTORS WARRANT that there has been no conveyance or 
granting by them of any rights of access or ingress and egress across, or 
associated with, said lands. ! 
Parcel No. 2: 00061314 Bk00392 Pg00788-00788-
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Section 12; SE VA NW H; SW VA NE VA\ N V2 SW VA; NW VA SE VA 
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazing rights, or any other 
rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to said lands. 
TOGETKDER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or in use 
on, said lands, including, but not limited to, water rights no. 91-328, 
91-29,91-3887,91-3690,91-3643 and 91-107, 
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, 
income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property,, or any 
part thereof. 
The Petitioner claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described 
lands, this being the object-of the action. 
DATED this o\ day of fTlcjr/^ , 2000. 
\/VLs 
Samuel P. Chiara 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Samuel P. Chiara #7829 
Attorney at Law 
98 North 400 East 
P.O. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-7011 
Fax: (435)636-0138 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Date 31-HAR-2000 l^Stm 
Fee: 61.00 Check 
SHARON MURC0CK, Recorder 
Fi led By JB 
For SAMUEL P CHIflRA 
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOND A LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs* • " 
KIM C. JENSEN, 
Respondent 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No.: 994700340 
Judge: Scott N. Johansen 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10* day of November, 1999, suit was 
commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of Utah, involving the above-named 
parties and 1he real properties described below, situated in Carbon County, State of Utah: 
Parcel No. 1: SN-2A0807-001 (40 acres): 
SE VA SE VA SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SLM. 
Parcel No. 2 - SN-2A-0826{80 acres): 
SE4NE4,NE4NE4of SEC I1,T13S,R8E, SLM 
Parcel No. 3 - SN 2 A-0827 (200 acres): 
N K SW Vi, NW VA SE'/«, SW VA NE VA, SE KNW lA, SEC 12, 
T13S,R8E,SLM. 
Parcel No. 4 - SN2A-0831 (428.31 acres): 
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S2S2, N2N2, NE4SE4, N 990 FT OF SE4NE4, SW4NW4 OF 
SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLM. LESS 1.69 AC FOR RR R/W, 
Parcel No. 5 - SN2A-0807 (48*0.29 acres): 
NW4 & S2 of SEC 1, T13S, R8E, SIM. 
Parcel No. 6 - S N 21-0808 (639.90 acres): 
ALL OF SEC 3, T13S, R8E, SLM. 
Parcel No, 7 - SN 2A-809 (200 acres): 
SE4, SE4NE4 OF SEC 4, T13S, R8E, SLM. 
Parcel No. 8 - SN 2A-1Q36 (543.47 acres): 
1. LOTS 1,2,3,4; E2W2; W2NE4;SB4 OF SEC 7, T13S, R9E 
2. SLM.ALSO,BEG875FTN&825FTWOFSECOROFLOT 
3. 2, N 39°30' W 70 FT; N 40° E 75 FT; S 39°30' E 70 FT; S 40° W 
4. 75 FT TO BEG. LESS 58 FT X 71 FT. LESS D&RGR/W 
5. LESS, BEG 460 FT E OF SW COR OF SEC; N 78° 268.4 FT; N 
6. 12° W278 FT; S 85° W 95 FT; S TO PT 115.2 FTN OF S LINE; 
7. S 78° W 127.5 FT; S 12° E 90 FT TO BEG. LESS PARCELS 
8. DESC IN QCDBK15 PG 627-10. 638. Less 21-1-36-1 (6.32 • 
ac) 
Parcel No. 9 - SN 2A-1036-019632 acres): 
1. BEG 250 FTN OF SE COR OF SW4NE4 OF SEC 7, T13S 
*L R5E, SLB&M; N 550 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT M/L TO N'LY 
3. LINEOFD&RGWRRRyW;E,LYALaN»LYRAV325FT 
4. M/L TO PT LYING W 220 FT M/L FROM PT OF BEG; E 
5. 220 FT M/L TO PT OF BEG. 
Parcel No. 10 - SN 2A-1060-002 (428.96 acres); 
LOTS 1,2,3 & 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4 NW4 SE4 OF 
SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&M. LESS RR R/W 
Parcel No. 11 - SN 2A-1057-0Q2 (40 acres): 
£ 0 7 9 4 7 a B 4 5 2 P <*G,4t 
c b o • CD o en o 
PTS000462 
49 n n n ? s a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o 
o cm • • DE . © c~ j 
SW J/4 SW lA, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM 
Parcel No. 12 - SN 2A-1031-004 (344.91 acres): 
1. LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4> SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, TI3S, R9E, 
2. SLB&M. ALSO, THOSE PORTIONS OF SE4SE4, NE4SE4, 
3. SW4NE4,&SE4NW4 LYING SW'LY OF FOLLOWING 
4. BNDRY LINE BEG AT APT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE * 
5. COR OF SE4SE4 & SE COR OF SE4SE4a NW'LY ON A 
6. LINE INTERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION 
7. BNDRY'S THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE 
8- OFSE4NW4. 
Parcel No. 13 - SN 2A-0310 (485.12 acres): 
S ¥x OF NlA; N Vz OF S lA\ LOTS 1,2,3,4; SEC 35, T12S, 
R8E,SLM 
ParcelNo. 14-SN2A-307 (161.33 acres): 
LOTS 1,2; N Vi OF SE *At SEC 34, T12S, R8E SLM. 
The Petitioner claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described 
lands, this being the object of the action. 
DATED this 3\ day of m&rd^ , 2000.' 
Samuel P. Chiara 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Dwocce/Tonda Jensen Ik PendcnSLdoc 
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Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner 
Resident of Carbon County-
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 6374)201 
Date "l^rcC-l&o! 5 S O P 3 3 3 
___ 9sl5a» 
Fee: 55.00 Cash 
SHARON HURDQCK, Recorder 
F i l e d By KR 
For TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner, 
KIM Q JENSEN, OWNER OF 
DOUBLE I TRIANGLE, LLC. 
Respondent 
Lis Pendens 
CMKO, Q±0<] Q[Q7JL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above mentioned names have had a Partnership, 
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all assets, 
Real Property, and income from any and all basmesses. 
Parcel:2A-0307-0000 Entry:015384 
Lots 1 ^ N1 /2 of SEE 1/4; SEC 34, T12S, R8E. SIM 161.33 AC 
Parcel:2A-0310-0000 Entry: 
S 1/2 of N1/2; N1/2 of S1/2; Lots 1£;3;4; SEC 35, T12S, R8E, SLM. 485.12 AC 
Parcel:2A-08O7-OO00 Entry:077487 
NW4&S2 0FSEC1,T13S,R8E,SIM 480.29 AC 
parcel: 2A-0807-0001 Entry: 015605 
SE1/4 SB 1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SIM. 40.00 AC 
parcel: 2A-0808-0000 Entry: 077487 
ALLOFSEC.3,T13S,R8E,SIM 639.90 AC 
parcel: 2A-0809-0000 Entry: 045678 
SE4; SE4NE4 OF SEC. 4, T13S, R8E, SIM 200.00 AC 
parcel: 2A-0826-0000 Entry: 000008 
SE4NE4,NE4N£40FSEC11,T13S,R8E,SLM 80.00 AC 
parcel: 2A-0829-0001 • Entry: 077487 
SW4NW4,NE4NW4; SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLB&M 141.22 AC 
parcel:2A-0831-0000 Entry:008370 
' -ID 
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r 
S2S2; NW4NW4; NE4SE4. SEC 12, TBS, R8E, SLB&M. 280.87 AC 
parcel: 2A-1031-0004 Entry:072274 
LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4, SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, T13S, R9E, SLB&M ALSO, THOSE 
PORTIONS OF SE 4SE4, NE4SE4, NW4SE4, SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SWLY OF 
FOLLOWING BNDRYLINE: BEGAT APT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE COR OF SE4SE4 & 
SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON ALTNE INT ERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION 
BNDRYS THRU WHICH LT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE OF SE4NW4. 344.91 AC 
parcel: 2A4036-0000 Entry: 065999 
LOTS 1,2, E/2NW4; W2NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. LESS 2A-1036-2 (7.32 AC) 
LESS PORTION S OF D&RGW RR R/W LESS PC 50 X1750 TO CARBON CO. LESS 2A-
1052 (.09 AC). 271.14 AC. 01/31/2002 04/29/2002 
parcel: 2A-1057-0002 Entry: 075500 
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, TBS, R9E, SLM. 40.00 
parcel: 2A-0827-0000 Entry: 
N1/2 SW 1/4, NW 1/4 SE V4, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NW1/4, SEC 12, TBS, R8E, 
SLM. 2OO.00 AC 
parcel: 2A-1060-0002 Entry: 089829 
LOTS 1,2,3,& 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4; NW4SE4 OF SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&M 
LESSRRR/W. 428.96 AC 
parcel:2A-1036-0GO3 Entry:089829 
No Recorder Notes Entered 
THAT PORTION OF LOTS 3&4; SE4SW4; NE4SW4; W2SE4; E2NW4; W2NE4 LYING 
SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERLY OF D&RGW RRR/W IN SEC 7, TBS, R9E, SLBM 24933 
01B1Z2002 04/29.2002 
parcel:2A-1036-0002 Entry:089828 ' 
BEG SE COR SW4NE4 SEC 7, TBS, 
1. CarbtHiCoTmryRealProrKaly^ I £ C , l ^ C . Jensen, owner, 
also Property known asaD of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 nfles west of Helper, Utah. 
2. Summit County Real Property, lOacres apprcx. has been deleted and sold by the Respondent 
3.Assets, 
a. 1999 Ford 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J. TB1ANGLE IXC. Kim C. lessen owner. ' 
b. Other asserts amounting to over 200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has bean transferring sod selling, 
4. Business income, 
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, lac. (Now, known, as Double I. 
Triangle. LLC. Owner Kim C Jensen. 
5. Business, 
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this lime. 
6. Cattfe leases, 
a. Respondent has kept all income at this time. 
% 7. "Water Rights, 
a. Nowtransfeaedinto the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen. 
8. Any and all Trust accounts since 19S3 
9. BYUPropefly, located in Spring Canyon 
10. Edward Evatz Property, locatedin Spring Canyon 
E 0 9 S 7 4 9 B 5 S O P 3 3 3 
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11. Kim JenseaRevokafale Trust 
12. AAAEaterprises, Triple A Entertainment Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper 
13. Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership 
14. Airy and all other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes. 
Petitioner ask die Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute. 
•During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate 
involved. Respondent has been depleting, Mding, transfetmgj, out of Petitioners 
name, Fraudulently. 
(Evidence exist). 
^Jsj^Vsr^ 
IN THE COUNTY OF CARBON; STATE 0? UTAH, ON TEES 19TH DAY 
OF DECEMBER 2002, BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY, 
PERSONALLY APPEARED TONDA LYNN HAMPTON WHO PROVED TO ME 
IDENTITY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OP A. 
UTAH DRIVERS LICENSE #147111801 TO BE THE PERSON WHO 
SIGNED THE PRECEDING DOCUMENT IN MY PRESENCE. AND WHO 
AFFIBMED TO ME THAT THE SIGNATURE IS VOLUNTARY AND THE 
DOCUMENT TRUTHFUL. 
CONNIE CASE 
HQTWPUBLIC *miEoIUTAH 
120 EAST MAIN 
PRICE, UT 84501 
COMM. EXP. 9-28-2003 
NOTARY SIGNATURE AND SEAL 
® E 0 9 S 7 4 3 B 5 2 0 P 3 3 - * 
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Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner 
Resident of Carbon County 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-0201 
Fees 5 5 . 0 0 Cash 
SHARON HURD0CK, Recorder 
F i l e d By KR 
For TONDft HAMPTON 
CARBON COUHTY C0RP0RRTION 
p 4oe 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIM C. JENSEN, OWNER OF 
DOUBLE L TRIANGLE, LLC. 
Respondent 
Lis Pendens 
CivilNo.: Q'^OlfrOQOy 
Judge: y. 
NOTICE IS HEREB Y GIVEN fhat the above mentioned names have had a Partnership, 
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all 
assets, Real Property, and income from any and all businesses. . 
Parcel:2A-0307-0000 Entry:015384 
Lotsl;2;Nl/2ofSEl/4;SEC34,T12S,R8E.SLM 161.33 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0310-0000 Entry: ' .• • * 
S 1/2 of N1/2; N1/2 of S 1/2; Lots 1;2;3;4; SEC 35, T12S, R8E, SLMl 485.12 AC 
Parcel:2A-0807-0000 Entry:077487 
NW4&S2 0FSEC1,T13S,R8E,SLM. 480.29 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0807-0001 Entry: 015605 
SE1/4 SE1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SIM. 40.00 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0808-0000 Entry: 077487 
ALLOFSEC.3,T13S,R8E,SLM. 639.90 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0809-0000 Entry: 045678 
SE4;SE4NE4 0FSEC.4,T13S,R8E,SLM. 200.00 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0826-0000 Entry: 000008 
SE4NE4,NE4NE4 0FSEC11,T13S,R8E,SLM 80.00 AC 
Parcel: 2A-0829-0001 Entry: 077487 
SW4NW4, NE4NW4; SEC 12, TBS, R8E, SLB&M. 141.22 AC 
Parcel:2A-0831-0000 Entry:008370 
S2S2;!NW4NW4;NE4SE4. SEC 12, T13S,R8E, SLB&M. 280.87 AC 
Parcel:2A-1031-0004 Entry:072274 
LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4, SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, T13S, R9E, SLB&M. ALSO, THOSE 
PTS000507! 
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PORTIONS OF SE 4SE4, NE4SE4, NW4SE4, SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SWLY OF 
FOLLOWING BNDRY LINE: BEG AT A PT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE COR OF SE4SE4 & 
SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON A LINE INT ERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION 
BNDRY'S THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE OF SE4NW4. 344.91 AC 
Parcel:2A-1036-0000 Entry:065999 
LOTS 1,2, E/2NW4; W2NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. LESS 2A-1036-2 (7.32 AC) 
LESS PORTION S OF D&RGW RR R/W LESS PC 50 X1750 TO CARBON CO. LESS 2A-
1052 (.09 AC). 271.14 AC. 01/31/2002 04/29/2002 
Parcel:2A-1057-0002 Entry:075500 
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM. 40.00 
Parcel: 2A-0827-0000 Entry: 
N1/2 SW 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NW' 1/4, SEC 12, T13S, R8E, 
SIM 2OO.00 AC 
Parcel: 2A-1060-0002 Entry: 089829 
LOTS U A & 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4; NW4SE4 OF SEC 18., T13S, R9E, 
SLB&M. LESSER R/W. 428.96 AC 
Parcel: 2A-1036-0003 Entry: 089829 
No Recorder Notes Entered 
THAT PORTION OF LOTS 3&4; SE4SW4; NE4SW4; W2SE4; E2NW4; W2NE4 LYING 
SOIJIH/SOUTHWESTERLY OF D&RGW RR R/W IN SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. 249.33 
01/31/2002 04/29.2002 
Parcel:2A-1036-0002 Entry:089828 
BEG SE COR SW4NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLB&M; N 800 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT 
MfL TO N'LY LINE OF D&RGW RR R/W; E'LY & SE'LY ALNG SD R/W TO E LINE OF 
NW4SE4 OF SD SEC 7; N ALNG SD E LINE TO BEG. 7.32 AC 01/31/2002 
Parcel: 1A-1358-0000 Entry:082712 
ALL OF LOTS 22,29 & 30, BLOCK 1, PLAT A, SHEYA ADD TO HELPER. 0.34 AC 
Parcel: 1A-1371-0000 Entry: 082712 
ALL OF LOTS 12,13, & 14, BLOCK 2, PLAT A, SHEYA ADD TO HELPER 0.34 AC 
1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, KimC. Jensen, 
owner, also Property known as all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west ofHelper, Utah. 
2. Summit County Real Property, 1 Oacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent 
3. Assets, 
a. 1999 Pord 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC. Kim C. Jensen owner. 
b. Other assets amounting to over $200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling. 
4. Business income, 
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, Inc. (Now, known as Double J. 
Triangle. LLC. Owner KimC. Jensen. 
5. Business, 
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this time. 
6. Cattle leases, . 
a. Respondent has kept all income at this lime. 
7. Water Rights, 
a. Now transferred into the Double I. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen. 
S. Any and all Trust accounts since 1983 
E 0 9 5 9 9 S B S 2 1 P 4 0 3 
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9. BYU Property, located m Spring Canyon 
10. Edward Evatz Property, located in Spring Canyon 
11. Kim Jensen Revokable Trust 
12. AAAEnterprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper 
13. Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership 
14. Any and all other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes. 
Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute. 
During this case, a Lis Pendens needs to be in place. To protect the Real Estate 
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners 
.name, Fraudulently. 
(Evidence exists). 
IN THE COUNTY OP CARBON, STATE OP UTAH, ON THIS 6th DAY OF JANUARY, 2003 
BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY, PERSONALLY APPEARED TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
WHO PROVED TO ME HER IDENTITY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE POEM OP 
UTAH DRIVER LICENSE TO BE THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS SIGNED ON THE PRECEDING 
DOCUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME TEAT SHE SIGNED IT VOLUNTARILY FOR ITS 
STATED PURPOSE. 
ALEXIS P. HORSLEY 
mwpmiC'STffiottJM 
120 EAST MAIN ST. 
PRICE, UT 84501 
COMM. EXP 7-1-2004 
E 0 9 5 9 9 S B 5 3 1 . P 4 0 4 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Stipulated Order dated January 23, 2002 
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FILED 
JAN 2 3 2002 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
KICHARD R. GOLDEN - 5957 
McMTSSE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
Attorney fot Respondeat. 
360 East.4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt-Lake Citys.Uiah 84107 
Tfetejkme:. (801) 266-33.9$ 
•S3S8S&* £*3Saat Fees .• 69-00 Check •*•• • 
SHAR8fcHURD0C&, Recorder ' 
.For PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES' 
CARBQH COUMTY CQRPORfiTIGH 
INTHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOM)AHAMPTON-JENS^,., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
K3M& JENSEN, " 
Respondent" 
S T I P U L A T E D O R D E R ON 
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONTOUFTOS 
PENDENS ON PORTIONS OF 
PROPERTT AND APPROVE SALE 
CONDITIONS . . 
Civil No. 994700340 
994700327 
3- J*3** i Judge ScottN. Johansen 
^ 
^ <& 
This matter came oh before the Court on December 7; 2001, as 3, telephonic hearing on. 
Respondent9s'Ex Parte Motion to LiftPetitioiier's-Lis PendenSonPortions of Property and Approve 
Sale Conditions'.-; Petitioner and her counsel, Douglas -Stowell were preseiat telephonically; 
Rssjjohdenfs counsely 'Richard Golden, -;was.also present by telephone. The Court heasd the 
arguments and proffers of counsel andhasreviewedihe files in this matter. Based thereon andbeing 
Silly advised, * the Court *kded"Respondenfs motioii should be grantedi, that is-the Petitioner's lis 
58 
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pendens is to "be lifted-on'the property subjectto sale as ordered hereinind that said property be*sold 
in accordance -with the terms'referred to inPetitioner'-s motion. 
Subsequently, that sale could riot take place because of the buyers5 inability to obtain an 
•appraisal timely. As a'result; the'parties' stipulated regarding a delayed closing date and other 
mattes, iandfiirfher agreed that the matter be cqmbined'-with'the Couit'sprevious-aondimcement-of 
its order, all as follows: 
1. It'is in.the best interests ofthe parties that the real property at issue in Respondent's 
motion be sold as requested by Respondent 
2. Petitioner's-Kspendens onsaidproperfyshpiddbeMedinorderto effectuate the sale 
of said property • 
3*. Respondeat, through counsel has rqprese&tedto.fhe Court thafcfhe sale is abonafide,' 
arm Vlength'tansasiion and.that neither Respondent nor Ms counsel is retaining any interest in the 
. pk)^e^§^fladlortto*fltofl^ are no other agreements, writfcenor oral, between Respondent.or 
.his'sttomey aiid the purchasers except those set forfh in the real prop'erty purchase agreements. 
4. Since. Shearing on this matter,' a- delay in closing has been requested by the buyers . 
because they have been unable to find an appraiser in time to close by the December 20,2001 date 
originally set Thepartres, thrpughcdunselby their signatures approvingthis document have agreed 
thafrclosing could be extended to on or before Jannary 20,200L 
* 5. Counsel for bothpaxdes, by approving tins Order, represent-to the Court that they do 
notspecializeinreal property transactions and that neither counielmakes any representations to the 
£ 0&^^Ar% B_ 4 S S , ' M 6 a . 
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Court, any party or any oth,ej:persbn:regardang-theproperiy descriptions in this Order; Rather the 
property descriptions herein'are-based soMy-on descriptions provided by the real estate brokers or 
titieinsiirance'compaides, copies of which have been provided to the Court.' 
6, ' Itis in the best interests- of theparties that certain 'costs and expenses be paid out of 
. the proceeds of-said sale, with the remainder placed in aninterest bearing trust account fer further 
distebuiion as may be determined proper. 
THEREFORE ITIS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The parcels of re&L property on which Respondent proposes to lift Petitioner's lis 
pendens are: . . . *
 t 
(1) Ghost Town Guest RanchLo'dge ahd-1lie. 637 acres on which! it is located; Tax 3D #'2A-
1036-002, Carbon County, .state of Utah. 
and 
(2) Approximately '675 Acres rarest ofHelper, Utah:AllofCarbonCdimt5rtaxID#2A-1060-
0002^ containing 42'8;9;6 acres more or less. All of 1he property ownedby Double J Triangle-
LLCwMchfeinCaa^^ 
except for' that portion of the property-that is in.the east half of l i e south-east quarter of 
Section 7 T13S; j&B;•coHfcaiftircg'approximately 246 acres. These.two 'parcels contain 
approximately 675 acres more or less.' 
2. Fe&tionerVKs pendens ia the following described real.property is hereby ordered 
released; 
The real'jftoperiy to'be sold is described as follows; 7500 West Spring CanyonRoadj Helper, 
'Uitah--84526y-joiore-particidarly described as follows:^ • 
BEGINNIN&.^u-point-25 of the Southeast Cornex.of fhb\.Sontirwest 
Quarter.ofIheNoriheast Quarter-of Section 73 Township" 13 South, Range-9East> Salt 
E O a ? 8 4 l B. . 4 9 S - - P 2 . 6 9 " . X-
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. -Lake Base .and Meridian* ^draoiriiigraence North. 550 feet; thence Vest 500 feet; 
thence 'South 385 feet, more pr less,, to the Northerly line of the D. & R.G.W.R.H 
right of Way; thence Easterly-dongthe, said-Noxtberly right-of- way line 325-.feet, 
more or less, to a point lying West 220 feet, more *or less,.from;the point of 
beginning; thence;East 220 feet, more or less, to-the pomt of beginning. 
' EXCEPTING tHerefrpm aU :oiL, gas add'otter minerals and mineral tights in and to 
said lands. 
Situate in Carbon Country, State of Utah. (Tax ID. # 2A4036-002) 
and:- . 
THE SXJ^ACEiaGHTSONLYIN ANDTO THEFOIiQ-WIISfGLiESCEIBBD TRACTS 
(DFLAND: 
Township .13 -South, Range-9"East? Salt lake B&se and Meridian: . . 
Section 7:
 : That portion of the following • described tracts of land lying 
^ontttSotriiLwestexly of the cT)enver & Kio Grande "Western Raikoad "right 
of way!3: 
Lois'3 'and 4; SE1/4 SW1/4; NEi/4;SWl/4; Wl/2 SE1/4; El/2 NW 1/4;" 
W1/2NE174 ' ' * 
Section 18: Lots 1,2,3'and 4; El/2 S]Wl/4; Elffi NW1/4; W1/2NE1/4; NW1/4 SE1/4. 
EXCEPTlNGfiom saidlands theinterests of fhe'penver andRio GCTide-WesternRaiiroad 
' Company, acqnired under feat certain ieed recorded December. 20,1926, in Book 5-L of 
Deeds at Page |99; as BntryNb'-12912. 
EXCEPTING from saidlands-all Rfflcbad Rights-ofWay. 
. (TaxID,#2A4036and2A4060r2)- .• 
situate'in Carbon County, State of Utah-
See Exhibit A,'(Scbednle'Ato,comTriTtment-for M e insurance). 
Jnaddition, two acrefeei-of water provided from bfeerproperfy ownedby Double JTiiangle 
r 
* istobemclndedinme-sale. 
4 
•E 0 ^ 8 4 1 B " ^ ^ 5 P 1 7 0 
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3. Hie Hs pendens is to remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property.. 
4. Encumbrances on the teal'.property at issue in this -case should paid^xit of'the 
proceeds ofthe sale., as-should the costs and expenses of the sale, including moving costs to remove 
personal property, commissions and the costs of title insurance, if saeh any such costs -are 
apportioned to'the seller. • • 
5. Specifically, the mortgage indebtedness to Zion s^ Bank on the property being sold 
istobepddbffbytheproceeds-ofsaid^le: • 
6- Indebtedness to EdEvatz on othsf portions ofthe Randhproperfyrathe approximate 
amountof$3,900.00-is" also to be paid out of those proceeds. 
7. The Guardian ad IitenvGene Byrge, should be-paid $4,000.00 ont ofthe proceeds, 
Which payment represents payment in full for Ms. Byrge's services- involving the children and the 
parties which payment shffi be deemed in satisfaction of her attorneys* lien previously filed. 
8. . ' The remainiiig proceeds are to be deposited into- aninterestbearing trust account, set 
up by counsel for both parties, with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds -are to 
be distributed as the Cqurt orders'and as the parlies may agree. * 
9- Theclosing electric bill on the Ranchshouldbe paid, thereby allowing the buyers to 
continue electrical: service. Counsel for the parties .are directed to* pay said bill after closing upon 
presentation of satisfactory evidence of the amount due, 
' 10. Federatand state tax returns for the Double J Triangle LLC, which holds title onthe 
real property, and the'pariies have been prepared by VanTiendren and Associates which company 
E o a ^ a - ^ i Bn J^S*S p i ? i . 
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real property, and the parties .have Seen prepared by Van Tiendrfcn and Associates which company 
is owed $2,000.00. Counsel for theparties'-are directed to pay the bill for those, services after closing 
upon presentation of satisfactory evidence of -the amount due. 
.11. Each of the parties shall be paid $5000 from the proceeds without prejudice to either 
party's positibh'in this cas'e anil further amounts may be-available upon mutual agreement of the 
parties. .Petitionees $5000 payment shall <b$ paid-to'the offices qf counsel-for Petitioner. 
Respondent5 s $5000. payment shall be available directly to Respondent. 
12. • The Court notes for the record that counsel for Petitioner has made every effort to 
review this Order withP'etitioner^ but counsel has.been unable to reach Petitioner to receive her final 
approval. Counsel for Petitioner believes-this Order'refiects substantially all matfersof an eadier 
version of this Orderand on which Counsel received Petitioner's 'agreement. Counsel for Petitioner 
believes this. Order reflects tins Court'sdedsion on the sale of the" subject property and protects 
Petitioner's rights, but Counsel for Petitioner has'been unable to receive Petitioner's final approval 
'regardingthis Order. 
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AttonieyWr Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF'MAILING 
- I hereby vceitiiy that I -mailed, .postage, prepaid, a 4we and correct, copy of the foregoing 
''ORDER. ONRESSONDENT^S MOTION TO IIFT'LIS -PENDENS ON-PORTIONS OF 
•PROPERTY AND APPROVE SALE CONDITIONS to the Mowing on this / ^ d a y of 
ij ,200.; 
Douglas L. Stowell 
397 East Staaton-Avemte 
Salt Lake City3Utah 84111 
A:\Oidcc an l i s PaadcoS2;wpd 
' • E |EJ£i.9eAt B 4 9 5 P 1 7 3 •'• .. uj[ 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Complaint filed in 2004 by Plaintiff 
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Tonda Lynn Hampton 
PlaintifftProse 
Resident of Carbon County 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435-637-0201) 
(; ,. 
nje*S*y: F I L E D ^ 
_ 
APR232004 
"SEVENTH DISTRICT-
COURT/CARBON 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
Plaintiff, 
COMPLAINT: 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
vs 
KIM C. JENSEN / RICHARD GOLDEN 
Defendant Case No. DY0 700^L5(^ 
FOR CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; 
1.1, Plaintiff, am a resident of Carbon County 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are property owners in Carbon County. 
3. Defendant's true address is unknown. 
4. Plaintiff/Beneficiary and Defendant have an "Interest Bearing Trust Account* * together; that 
require parties to agree and two signatures to release any monies. 
(Trust created in approx. January 2002: "Golden Trust Account"; notation; Richard Golden is 
one of the Defendants attorney's, both creators' of mentioned Trust. Quote defendants; "There 
are no other agreements, oral or written, between either-of them" stated on Jan. 23rd, 2002 court • 
order). 
5.1, Plaintiff, on information and belief, allege that the Defendant is Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
6. The trust account no longer exists. 
7. Defendant no longer obtains this attorney in question. 
PTS-000973 
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8.1 believe my Joint Partner/Defendant has now sold all of our other Carbon Coxmty Real estate, 
as of approx. 2004; once deeded, in both of Plaintiff's and Defendants names approx. 3200 acres 
that description listed in a Wild Life Division Easement Sale. 
9. Record will show that, somehow, a Limited Liability Company sold our Real estate interest 
10. Defendants True Records will show that Petitioner has never given any oral or written 
document to allow any ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre. Which are at issue. 
11. Petitioner is filing a Complaint within Jurisdiction. 
12. There are court orders from previous cases# 994700340 and # 994700327 involving a 
a. Protective Order and, 
b. Civil Action: Common Law Marriage 
c. Lis Pendens filed on Nov. 15th, 1999 to Dec. 17*, 2002 in the case numbers mentioned. 
13. Which Real estate mentioned; owned by the Petitioner and the Defendant Jointly and under 
one or the other name is given Liz Pendens protection during the action; and, 
14. Dec. 31st 2001 due to a decision; Court Bifurcate the property issues at that time. 
13. As of Aag2d^ 2002, Trial; dismissed the Common Law Action. 
14. Aug. Trial released a lis Pendens off of the mentioned Property as of Dec. 17th. 2002. 
15- Dec. 18th, 2002, Defendant has an Easement SaleContract ($600,000.00) 
16. Jan. 23rd, 2002 order is at issue. 
(Jan.23rd, of 2002, court order: Refer to attached document). 
I, Petitioner, move the court to make and enter an Order, on the defendant to hand over 
all "True to Record" documentation involving the Real estate purchases between the Parties, 
Transfers, Real estate sales agreements, and not limited to the Interest Bearing Trust Account 
that I believe transferred with out my authorization. 
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Petitioner seeks immediate attention in the above. 
a. Defendant is avoiding all certified mailing to all nine adciresses known to Petitioner. 
b. The Limited Liability Company addresses also avoid all certified mailing. 
(True Record; Agent/Owner of the LLC Company is the Defendant as of approx. Aug. 
2003). 
c. As of this time, Defendant has not contacted Plaintiff at all by phone: 
d. Defendant has phone number, given by Petitioner to his previous Paternity Attorney in 
2003. 
Plaintiff seeks foil recovery of all her losses, due to any unacceptable behavior. 
All monies that are or been generated from the Real estate ground to be reimbursed. 
1. Cattle leases, owned by the Parties to this date, 
2. CWMU Private Hunting Unit, voucher sales, and not limited to, 
3. Water rights, which Plaintiff and Defendant owned as of 2004. 
4. All land sales that went into the Interest Bearing Trust Account. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on A^JLLI ^Z^j^booQ , I mailed by certified 
* mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT to the following: 
Address: 
Double J. Triangle, LLC 
P.O. Box 415 
Helper Utah, 84526 
Address: PMB 169,2274 South, 1300 East, 
STEG-15 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Motion to Dismiss, filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit, including as attachments: 
(a) Order disposing of the 1999 Suit; 
(b) Findings and Conclusions in the 1999 Suit; 
(c) Complaint filed by Plaintiff in the 2002 Suit; 
(d) Complaint filed by Plaintiff in the 2003 Suit; 
(e) Order and Judgment disposing of the 2002 and 2003 Suits. 
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RONALD H. GOODMAN - #3650 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street, P. O. Box 727 
American Fork, UT 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
KIM C. JENSEN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No.. 040700256 
Judge Bruce Halliday 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kim C. Jensen, by and through bis attorney, Ronald 
H. Goodman, and moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant. Defendant relies 
upon the doctrine of Res Judicata as alleged in his Answer, and alleges that Plaintiffs claims have 
already been adjudicated by mis Court. This Motion to Dismiss is supported by Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed contemporaneously with this Motion. 
Dated this 7^_ day of A4pt{ . 2006. 
RONALD H. GOODMAN^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herehy certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing postage prepaid 
in the U.S. Mail this.^2 day of frt-*^, 2006, to TondaLynn Hampton, Plaintiff, P. O. Box 586 
Price, Utah 84501. 
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FILED 
MAY 3 0 2006 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS RONALD H. GOODMAN - #3650 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street, P. O. Box 727 
American Fork, UT 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIM C. JENSEN, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No.. 040700256 
Judge Bruce Halliday 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kim C. Jensen, by and through his attorney, Ronald 
H. Goodman, and submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiff s Complaint filed in this Court in Case No. 994700340 asking for a 
determination of a common-law marriage and for a Decree of Divorce was dismissed on December 
12,2006, because the Court found that there had been no common-law marriage between the parties. 
Seethe Order and Findings and Conclusions attached as Exhibit I and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
2. On December 13,2002, Plaintiff filed in this Court in Case No. 020701072 a 
72 
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Complaint against Defendant alleging a partnership existed between the parties, requesting the 
dissolution of the partnership and splitting of all assets, real property and income. Specifically, the 
Complaint listed assets of cattle leases, C WMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights, and real property, 
as well as "any and all Trust accounts since 1983." See the Complaint attached as Exhibit II and 
incorporated herein by this reference* 
3. On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed in this Court in Case No. 030700004 a 
Complaint against Defendant alleging again p. partnership between the parties, and among other 
things, fraud onDefendanf spart. Again, Plaintiff asked the Court to recover on personal assets and 
real property, again listing cattle leases, C WMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights, and any and all 
Trust accounts since 1983, See the Complaint attached as Exhibit III and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
4 OnApril 25,2003,llieHonorableBryceK.BrynerenteredMs"RulingonMotion 
to Dismiss Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to 
Release Lis Pendens" concerning both Casenos. 020701072 and 030700004. Judge Biyner's Ruling 
in effect dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims for fraud, loss of business and partnership claims and 
released the Lis Pendens filed against Defendant's real property.. See Judge Bryner's Ruling on 
Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion 
to Release Lis Pendens attached as Exhibit IV and incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. In the Complaint filed by Plaintiff in this case presently before the Court, Plaintiff 
2 
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has alleged breach of fiduciary duty regarding an alleged trust account created in January, 2002, 
again naming Defendant as a Partner (paragraph 8), and claiming that Defendant sold Plaintiff and 
Defendant's real estate without her permission. Again, in this Complaint, Plaintiff is asking for 
recovery for cattle leases, CWMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights and real property sales. 
6. Defendant has filed an Answer in this matter alleging the afiHrmative defense of 
Res Judicata, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA ACTS AS A COMPLETE BAR TO 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADJUDICATED BY 
THIS COURT. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Centennial Edition (1891-1991), gives the following 
definition of Res Judicata: 
A matter adjudge; a thing acted upon or decided; a thing or matted 
settled by judgment Rule that a final judgment rendered by a court 
of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights 
of the parties and their privies, and as to them, constitutes an absolute 
bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause 
of action. And to be applicable, requires identity in thing sued for as 
well as identity of cause of action, of persons and parties to action, and 
of quality in persons for or against whom claim is made. The sum and 
substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially decided is 
finally decided 
In the case before the Court, Defendant submits that Plaintiff s claims have already 
been decided by this Court. Plaintiffs present Complaint is a poorly disguised attempt to bring 
before the Court claims which this Court has already denied her. The Court's decision from the 
3 
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common-law marriage claim (Case no. 994700340) denied Plaintiffs claims for amarriage and for 
her interest in Defendant's real property. The trust account alleged by Plaintiff to have been created 
in January, 2002, would have been at issue during the "common-law marriage" case because that 
case was not decided until August 26,2002, and Findings, Conclusions and Order did not enter until 
December 12,2002. Therefore, the Court's decisionkthatmatter acts as Res Judicata to Plaintiff 
claims made in this case. 
Undauntedbythe Court's decisioninCaseno. 994400340, Plaintiff stwo Complaints 
filed within twenty (20) days of each olher (Case No. 020701072 filed on December 17,2006, and 
Case No. 030700004 filed on January 6,2003) appear to have been filed by Plaintiff to try again to 
take Defendant's assets and tie up the sale of his real property. Judge Bryner5 s decision effectively 
squelched those meritless claims, and acts as Res Judicata to Plaintiffs claims in this case as well. 
It is interesting to note that Plaintiff in each of her three (3)subsequent Complaints 
to Case No. 994700340, has asked for recovery against Defendant's cattle leases, CWMU Private 
Hunting Unit, water rights, and real property. Also, in each subsequent Complaint, trust accounts 
have been alleged. This third Complaint should be dealt with by dismissal as well. 
If the trust account alleged in this Complaint was actually created in January, 2002, 
the issue should have been decided by the Court's December 17, 2002 decision in Case No. 
994700340. 
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 
4 
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P2cL 387 (UtahApp. 1987) is instructive regarding this case. It states the following at page 389: 
The doctrine of res judicata has two related but distinct branches. 
Both branches, however, have the dual purpose of protecting 
litigants from the burden ofrelitigating an identical issue with the 
same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by pre-
venting needless litigation. Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc. 669 
P2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983); see gnerallly Blonder-Tongue Labor* 
atories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-
329, 91 & CL 1434,1442-1443, 28 L EcL2d 788 (1971) 
One branch, claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of a claim that 
previously has been fully litigated between the same parties. To in-
voke this branch of res judicata, both suits must involve the same 
parties or their privies and the same claim or cause of action. 
Furthermore, the first claim must have been litigated on the merits 
and must have resulted in a final judgment Penrod, 669 P2d at 875. 
In such a case, claim preclusion prevents relitigation not only of claims 
actually litigated in (he first proceeding, but also claims which could 
and should have been litigated in the prior action but were not raised. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs trust account claim in this case could and should have been raised in Case 
No, 994700327. That case was decided against Plaintiff, Plaintiff included in her Complaints in 
Case Nos. 020701072 and 030700004 "any and all trust accounts since 1983," Those cases were 
decided against Plaintiff 
The matters before the Court in Plaintiffs Complaint herein have already been 
judicially decided, and Plaintiff is not entitled to another "bite of the apple." The doctrine of Res 
Judicata bars Plaintiffs claims. 
5 
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be dismissed 
CONCLUSION 
Base upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiffs Complaint 
Dated this 2 ^ day of MQ^-, 2006. 
RONALD H. GOODMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing postage prepaid 
in the U.S. Mail tins ffiday'of ^ - ? ^ 2 0 0 6 , to Tonda Lynn Hampton, Plaintiff, P. O. Box 586 
Price, Utah 84501. 
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EXHIBIT I 
PTS-000803 
79 0 0 0 3 5 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- W 1 / / U Z I B : 2 i FAX 435 637< ) 2 JUVENILE CT 
@008 
Steven Kuhhhausen (1861) 
Attorney for Respondent 
10 West Broadway 
Suite 603 ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-1555 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
TN1HESBVENTHDISTOICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOND A LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN 
Petitioner. 
vs 
KIM C. JENSEN 
Respondent 
ORDER 
Civil No. 994700340 
Judge: Johaasen 
1. 
2. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered in the above 
captioned matter, the Court now makes and enters the following Order: 
Petitioner's Complaint be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
The lis pendens filed by the Petitioner in this action are .hereby ordered released and 
discharged which are lodged against Respondents' real property in the Carbon County 
State of Utah Recorders' Office as entry no. 77489 in book 445, entry no. 78686 in 
book 449, entry no. 79477 in book 452 and any other lis pendens filed by Petitioner 
against Respondent's real property.-
Pursuant to § 30-1-17.2, Petitioner is awarded $10,000.00 as and for attorney fees 
upon the sale of Respondent's ranch or any portion thereof or release of the fimds held 
8 0 
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in trust by Respondent's former attorney Mclntyre and Golden. 
DATED this^day of December, 2002 
approved as to form 
CERTIFIC ATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the/f; day of December, 2002 a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was mailed to: 
/ Douglas Stowell 
5 ^ * ^ 3 0 7 East Stanton Ave. 
T* Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mclntyre & Golden 
3838 South West Temple 
|t Lake City, Utah 84115 
"7 
/ 
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SCVHNTH DISTRICT COURTS 
m THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN 
Petitioner. 
vs 
KIM C.JENSEN 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Civil No. 994700340 and 994700327 
Judge: Johansen 
This matter came on for trial on the 26* day of August, 2002. Both parties were in 
attendance with their attorneys, Doug Stowell for Petitioner, and Rick Goldea, for Respondent. 
The attorneys requested an in-camera conference prior to the beginning of the trial during which 
they both outlined their respective cases. When the trial began, the Court required the Petitioner 
to proffer the nature and extent of her evidence on the crucial elements of UCA 30-1-4.5 pursuant 
to the in-camera discussion. Respondent was allowed to likewise proffer his evidence on the 
same. Both parties stipulated to admission of a taped conversation between the parties, exhibit 
#1. Based upon prior findings and conclusions, the pleadings, the tape recording admitted into 
evidence^ and the proffers of counsel as to the testimony of various witnesses as outlined below, 
the Court now makes the following findings and conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties cohabited with each other from 1982 until 1996, 
1 
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The parties had two children in common, both born prior to November, 1996. 
In November, 1996, the parties signed an agreement which terminated-the marital union, if 
any existed, up to that time. 
After November, 1996, the parties at times cohabited with each other, until November, 
1999. 
Certain witnesses would testify that the parties held a joint bank account sometime after 
1996. 
Certain witnesses would testify that the parties held a joint credit card after November, 
1996. 
Certain witnesses would testify that real property and water rights were jointly held by the 
parties sometime after 1996, 
The parties had consensual sexual relations with one another between November, 1996, 
and November, 1999. 
On three occasions between November, 1996, and November, 1999, Petitioner rebuffed 
proposals by Respondent to many. 
Petitioner's assertion that she rejected Respondent's marriage proposals because she 
considered herself already married flies in the face of the 1996 agreement, as well as 
Petitioner's response to Respondents' summary judgment motion thai she was totally 
ignorant of the law, and her prior position that she was frightened of Respondent and 
stayed with Mm only because she was afraid to leave. 
At times between November, 1996, andNovember, 1999, the parties shared duties 
commonly shared by husband and wife. 
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12. Certain witnesses would testify they believed the parties were husband and wife. 
13. Certain witnesses would testify that they did not believe that the parties were husband and 
wife. 
14. Certain witnesses would testify that at times the parties held themselves out to be husband 
and wife. 
15. Certain witnesses would testify that at times the parties specifically held themselves out to 
be other than husband and wife. 
16. Certain witnesses would testify that the Petitioner specifically said that she was not 
married to respondent. 
17. Certain witnesses would testify that Respondent always referred to Petitioner as a 
girifiiend or fiance. 
18. Certain witnesses would testify that the Respondent on occasion referred to Petitioner as 
his wife and to himself as Petitioner's husband. 
19. Some of the parties closest friends and family did not consider them to be married. 
20. The parties were not consistent in holding themselves out as married to the rest of the 
world. 
21. Thomas E. Nelson, an estate planning attorney, would have testified that he prepared 
estate planning documents on the basis of Respondent being unmarried ( date unclear). 
22. The parties filed separate income tax returns prepared in 1998 and in prior years. 
23. Evidence of the parties' reputation of being married would be partial and conflicting. 
24. Petitioner may reap financial gain if a common law marriage is found to exist. 
25. Neither party is currently married to another. 
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Both parties have obtained their majority. 
• Petitioner has fled a lis pendensagainst Respondent's real property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UCA 30-1-4.5 is controlling law in this case. 
The relevant time period during which the existence or lack thereof of a claimed common 
law marriage between the parries is November, 1996, to November, 1999. 
Consent to the existence of a marital contract is required under UCA 30-1-4.5. 
Respondent proposed multiple times to Petitioner which Petitioner rejected each time. 
A manifestation of intention not to accept an offer is a rejection of the offer. 
There is no evidence of a particular point in time at which mutual consent to establish a 
marital relationship between the parties existed. 
While the parlies acquiesced in certain cohabitation arrangements between November, 
1996, aad'Novembei; 1999, there is insufficient evidence of a deliberate intention that a 
marriage would result 
The parties did not consent to the existence of a martial contract, 
By refusing Respondent's proposal to assume martial rights, duties,, and obligations, 
Petitioner indicated her preference to " just live together" without mutual agreement to 
form a marriage. 
The parties are capable of giving consent to a marriage. 
The parties are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage,, 
The parties have at times mutually assumed rights, duties and obligations between 
November, 1996 and November, 1999. 
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The evidence of reputation as husband and wife is partial, divided, and not general or 
uniform. ' 
Evidence of each element of UCA 30-1-4.5 is essential to establish a valid marriage under 
this statue which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Public policy weighs heavily in favor of narrow interpretation of common law marriage. 
Properly solemnized marriage is an institution for the preservation of the human race and 
happiness of all mankind. It is recognized as an honorable estate. Our nation and its 
prosperity are founded upon homes of the people, and for this reason our legislature has 
established laws for its protection and preservation. 
A properly solemnized marriage is in the best interest of children. 
The State has a compelling interest in encouraging properly solemnized marriages. 
Care must be given to guard against fraudulent marriage claims especially where a 
declaration of marriage would result in financial rewards for the pumtive spouse. 
When a reward is available, human nature may choose to strengthen and augment, in 
retrospect, the consent to marry that was only tentative before the reward became 
available. 
The parties were not married during the period between November, 1996 and November 
1999. 
Petitioner has Med to meet her burden of proof as to an unsolemnized marriage. 
In an action/to determine tie validity of a marriage the Court may make orders relative to : 
the parties properly and children pursuant to § 30-1-17,2 including attorney fees and 
Petitioner's counsel has filed a Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees. 
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23'. Because no* marriage exists their can be no- divorce decree as prayed for fa Count II of 
Petitioner's Complaint. 
DATED this /^day of December, 2002 
approved as to 
BY THE COURT 
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CER1TFIC ATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ALday of December, 2002 a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was mailed to: 
I Douglas Stowell 
fyz£uKtf/'$Q7 East Stanton Ave. 
if . Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mclntyre & Golden 
3838 South West Temple 
.. . Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner 
Resident of Carbon County 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-0201 
- FILED 
; C T n r r 
"IN THE SEVENTH-JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
• Petitioner, Complaint 
vs. Civil No.: 0ad)7O/#7<2 
KM C. JENSEN, OWNER OF 
DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE, LLC. 
Respondent 
Judge: uW&nssts' . 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above mentioned names have had. a Partnership, 
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all 
* assets, Real Property, and income from any and all businesses. 
1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, KimC. Jensen, 
owner, also Property known as all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah. 
2. Summit County Real Property, lOacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent. 
3. Assets, 
a. 1999 Ford 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE L TRIANGLE LLC. Kim C. Jensen owner. 
b. Other assets amounting to over 200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling. 
4. Business income, 
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, Inc. (Now, known as Double J. 
Triangle. LLC. Owner Kim C. Jensen-. • 
5. Business, ' " • 
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this time. 
6. Cattle leases, •• * 
a. Respondent has kept all income at this time. 
7. Water Rights, 
a. Now transferred into the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen. 
8. Any and all Trust accounts since 1983 
9. BYU Property, located in Spring Canyon 
10. Edward Evatz Property, located in Spring Canyon 
11. Kim Jensen Revokable Trust , 
12. AAA Enterprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper 
13. Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership 
14. Any and alll other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes. 
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Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute. 
' During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate 
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transf erring,, out of Petitioners 
name, Fraudulently. 
(Evidence exist). . - . 
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Tonda Lynn Hamplon 
Petitioner 
Resident of Carbon County 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone. (435) 637-0201 
FILED ' • 
JAN ~6 2003 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
IN TIIM'SI-VI-NTM JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIM C. JENSEN, OWNLR or 
DOUBLE J, TRIANGLE, LLC. 
Respondent 
Complaint 
Civil No.: a%Q 746044* 
Judge : J^p^jcAJ 
**\ 
NOTICE IS 11KRKBY GIVEN that the above mentioned names have had a Partnership, . 
involving Real Property, and personal assets, the Petitioner would also like to bring to attention 
that the Respondent has been very abusive in this relationship; 
Defamation, Slander, not limited to Physical Abuse and Emotional Maltreatment, has caused 
Petitioner to lose her share in the business, due to Fraud, and her Reputation damaged, Petitioner 
also seeks a Lis Pendens on the remaining Real Property until this matter is fully resolved. 
Respondent has sold and hidden the Real Property at this time. Petitioner seeks full recovery on 
the Personal assets, and on the Real Property. 
At this time Lhe Petitioner ask the courts to reverse ownership to resolve, and sue for all 
damages. 
1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, Kim C Jensen, 
owner, also Property known ES all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah. 
2. Summit County Real Property. lOacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent 
3. Assets, 
a. 1999 Ford liO Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J TRIANGLE LLC Kim C Jensen owner 
b Other assets amounting 10 OYCT 200, 000 00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling 
4 Business income. 
a. Bed &. Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghosi Town Guest Ranch. Jnc (Now, known as Double I 
Triangle LLC Owner Kim C Jensen. 
5. Business, 
a CWMU Private Hunting tJnii Respondent has kcpL 100% of income ai this lime 
6 Cattle leases, 
a. .Respondent has kept ail income at this lime. 
7 Water Rights, 
-A--
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a Now transferred into the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen 
.8. Any and all Trusi accounts since 1983 
9 BYTJ Propeny, located in Spring Canyon 
JO Edward Rvat? Property, locaicd in Spring Canyon 
11 Kim Jensen Rcvokabie Trust 
12 AAA F-werprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escon Service, Glass Slipper 
13. Kim C Jensen Family Limned Partnership 
14. Any and all orher hidden accounts, companies. Trust notes 
Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute. 
During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate 
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners 
name, Fraudulently and maliciously. . 
(Evidence exist). 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
APR 2 5 2003 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, . . 
Plaintiff 
VS. • 
. KTM C. JENSEN, owner of DOUBLE 
J. TRIANGLE, LLC, 
Defendant. 
) 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION 
TO RELEASE LIS PENDENS 
CaseNos. 020701072 and 030700004 
)• . Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
On March 21, 2003, the defendant filed one motion entitled Motion to Dismiss, Motion to 
•Dismiss Lis Pendens, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Damages for Wrongful Lien (hereinafter "the defendant's motion"), together with a 
supporting memorandum. The plaintiff responded with ^ Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Oppositi'on to which the defendant filed a Reply. A Notice to Submit for Decision's filed on 
April 24, 2003, and the motion is ripe for decision. The court has read and considered the 
memorandum and now issues the following ruling: 
The plaintiffs pro se complaint filed on December 18, 2002, requests the dissolution of an 
alleged partnership between the parties. The plaintiffs pro se complaint filed on January 6, 
2003, appears torequest a dissolution of partnership and further asserts claims of defamation, 
slander, physical and emotional abuse, fraud, and loss of business interests. The court notes, 
however, that the plaintiff on page 15 of her Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
subsequently withdrew her claim for physical abuse. 
• The defendant's motion seeks a dismissal of the complaints on the grounds that; (1) certain 
of the plaintiffs claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (2) other 
claims in her complaint are time:barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The defendantl 
Q6 
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also seeks a release of the lis pendens filed by the plaintiff as well as summary judgment on the 
issue of the partnership claims. 
The plaintiffs complaint dated January 6, 2003, alleges the following causes of action: 
1. Emotional Maltreatment In paragraph 9 of plaintiff s affidavit dated April 1,2003, 
attached to her memorandum, the plaintiff claims that oh March 2, 2002, the ''Defendant .violated 
a protective-order and contacted me, verbally assaulting me." 
Emotional, maltreatment is an intentional tort and is therefore subject to the one year statute 
" of limitation stt forth in UCA 78-12-29. Although the complaint was filed within one year of the 
alleged "verbal assault," the court finds that the action for assault fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The court is persuaded that verbal abuse is not a cause of action, and 
if the defendant is claiming emotional distress as a result of verbal abuse, the plaintiff has not 
met the burden of pleading conduct considered outrageous or intolerable by societal standards. 
2. Defamation and Slander: In paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs affidavit, the plaintiff claims 
• that on August 26, 2002, (the day of trial) she first "became aware of false statements made to 
various individuals by the defendant whichrelated to [her] character." She specifically avers-that 
the defendant called her a "slut" and a "filthy pig," and that such statements were made to Sharon 
" Jensen, Delvin McFarland, and Randy Finkbinder. 
Defamation and slander are intentional torts and are subject to the one year statute of 
limitations set forth in UCA 78-12-29 (4).§ .However, the one year period of limitations does not 
begin to run until the slander or defamation is known or is reasonably discoverable by a plaintiff. 
' Allen v. Ortiz. 802 P.2d 1307 (TJtah 1990). The complaint was filed on January 6, 2003. 
Because the plaintiffs complaint for defamation and slander were filed within one year after the 
statements were discovered, the action is not time-barred by the one year statute of limitation 
. 3. Fraud: Rule 9 (b)" of the UtahRules of-Civil Procedure requires that the circumstances 
surrounding ffaud be plead with particularity. The court has examined the complaint and finds 
PTS-000821 
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that the alleged fraud has not been pled with particularity. The complaint merely states that the 
' plaintiff lost her share in the business ""due to -fraud." 
Additionally, the date of the alleged fraud is not stated in the complaint.nor'is it stated 
when the alleged fraud was discovered:by the-plaintiff. An action for fraud must be filed within 
3 years of the fraud or the discovery thereof. UCA 78-12-26 (3). It cannot be determined from 
the face of the complaint when, the cause of action arose in order to be able to establish when the 
statute of limitatiohs began to run. 
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted and the said cause of action is ordered dismissed. 
4. Loss of Business: The plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for'"loss of business," and the 
complaint does not assert that the claim is..based upon a written agreement. Accordingly, the 4 
year statute of limitation set forth in UCA 78-12-25(1) is applicable. The complaint does not 
identify the business that allegedly suffered the loss nor does it state the date upon which the 
cause of action arose or the damages suffered. The cause of action for "loss of business" 
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
5. Partnership: Both complaints allege a partnership "and in essence request the court to 
dissolve the partnership. A partnership based on an oral agreement is.subject to. the 4 year statute 
of limitation set forth in UCA. There is a disagreement in the affidavits, however, as to when the 
partnership ended and when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiff asserts that the 
partnership terminated when the plaintiff vacated the premises on November 1, 1999, and that 
the claim for partnership was timely in each case within the 4 year limitation period. The court 
ctonot determine when the defendant claims the partnership terminated, except that he claims it 
terminated more than 4 years priorto the filing of the complaint on December 13, 2002. Thus 
there is a material and mixed issue of fact and law with regard to the defense of statute of 
limitations, i.e., when the partnership terminated and when the statute of limitations began to run. 
PTS-000822 
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Nevertheless, the court finds that under Rule 13 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the claim 
for partnership and dissolution of partnership should have been brought as a compulsory 
counterclaim when the plaintiff filed her answer and 'amended answer to the defendant's 
counterclaim in the common law divorce case in the Seventh District Court in Carbon County. 
The failure to do so is fatal to the plaintiffs causes of action for partnership and dissolution of 
partnership. The claims for partnership and dissolution are therefore ordered dismissed and the 
lis pendens filed in the Carbon County Recorder's office as.a result of the claims asserted in each 
of the above two cases are ordered released. 
•DATED this 25th day of April, 2003. • . ' 
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Order Disposing of the 2004 Suit 
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL CpURT IN AND FOR C: 
STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KIM C JENSEN, 
Defendants, 
ORDER 
' Case No. 040700256 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Kim C. Jensen' (*Jensen'') has filed a motion to 
dismiss on the ground that the claims made by plaintiff Tonda 
'Lynn Hampton (''Hampton") are precluded by the decisions made in 
case numbers 994700340, 994700327, 020701072, and 030700004, all 
filed in Carbon County, Hampton opposes dismissal. 
The court has read Hampton's complaint filed on April 23, 
2 004. Rule 8, U.R.C.P., requires that a complaint contain a 
"short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader 
*is entitled to relief" and "a demand for judgment for the relief" 
desired. Hampton's complaint does not satisfy this standard.. 
While there are portions of the complaint that are 
understandable, most of the numbered paragraphs do not 
communicate any meaning to the court. Taken as a whole, the 
1 
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complaint does not explain what has happened, and why what has 
happened entitles Hampton to relief from this court. Moreover, 
given that this court has seen four previous lawsuits between 
these parties in the past seven years, it does not appear likely 
that Hampton can prepare and file an amended pleading compliant 
with Rule 8. The complaint is accordingly dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Jensen asserts that the doctrine of res judicata bars this 
action. Since that argument raises matters outside the 
pleadings, namely the substance of the other disputes resolved 
earlier, this must be treated as motion for summary judgment. 
The court takes judicial notice of the filings in those other 
cases which have been attached to pleadings filed in this case. 
From those pleadings, the court is satisfied that, to the extent 
Hampton may have succeeded in stating a claim that satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 8, U.R.C.P., that claim either was, or' 
should have been, raised in at least one of'those earlier cases. 
Jensen is accordingly also entitled to summary judgment and 
Hampton's complaint is hereby dismissed on that ground as well. 
2 
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This order is the final order of this court in this case. 
No further order or judgment is required. 
Dated t h i s M day of September, 2006 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of t h e a t t a c h e d document was s e n t t o t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e f o r c a s e 040700256 by t h e method a n d on t h e d a t e 
s p e c i f i e d . 
METHOD NAME 
Mail TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
PLAINTIFF 
PO BOX 586 
PRICE, UT 84501 
Mail RONALD H GOODMAN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
8 N CENTER ST 
POB 727 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003-0727 
Dated this 20 7)0. 
Page 1 (last) 
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Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
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TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
P.O.BOX 586 
Price Utah 84501 
Tele: (435) 650-3333 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON I 
Plaintiff, I 
Vs. ( 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, 
a corporation 1 
Defendant; ( 
CLAY G. HOLBROOK an individual < 
Defendant ( 
: PLAINTIFF MEMORANDUM 
[ IN OPPOSITION 
; TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
{ SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{ Case No.: 070700813 
' Judge: Douglas B. Thomas 
Plaintiff, Tonda Lynn Hampton as Pro Se, in accordance with Rule 7 (c)(1) 
U.R.C.P., herby submit her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and assert she is entitled to have Defendants' Motion Denied on the 
grounds of Concealment and Material Fact and there is genuine issues for Trial as will be 
stated below: 
Plaintiffs Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff makes a general objection to all defendants' statement numbered 1 through 6. 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the running of the respective statutes of 
limitations; 
Response: Denies, 
BLED 
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a. An Oral Agreement in effect approximately the year of 2007 and for that reason 
Plaintiff filed in a timely manner (within one year). 
b. Fraud filed within 3 years UCA 78-12-26 (3). 
c. Defendants Files, produced in 2008, have now exposed the concealed 
documents and due to the intentional Fraudulent Concealment and the 
avoidance by the defendants to produce to Plaintiffs earlier request Toll the 
Statute of Limitations. 
2. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the issue preclusion branch of the doctrine of 
res judicata; 
Response: Denies, 
a. This case is based on Oral Agreements the Defendants' entered into on 
approximately the year of 2007. 
b. During this case the Third Amended Complaint mentions Fraud now 
discovered within the Defendants files produced during Rule 26 Discovery 
stage which documents have previously been concealed. 
3. Defendants complied with their duties as closing and escrow agents, and the facts 
demonstrate that they cannot be liable for breach of contract, negligence, slander 
of title, or fraud; 
Response: Denies, 
Defendants did not do their full duty of care before the escrow order where into 
effect. Defendants have interfered with Plaintiffs titled ownership prior to the to the 
Stipulation Order dated January 23, 2002 and Escrow order dated approximately 
January 25, 2002 and continued to conceal other documents until 2008 Discovery 
1A7 
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stage and therefore are responsible and liable. Defendants caused error in the "Chain 
of title" which Holbrook admitted before July 2007 and did agree to compensate for 
her losses, before the date of the filed Complaint dated August 14, 2007. Plaintiff 
claims Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment has been carried out by the Defendants 
and will demonstrate in her Opposition to the Summary Judgment with her Affidavit 
attached to her once deed real estate. 
4. There was no meeting of the minds regarding any alleged settlement agreement; 
Response: Deny 
There was a final Agreement and not negotiation Defendant Holbrook realized 
plaintiffs position and his. He contacted her with a figure to relinquish her rights for 
$21,185.47 to a certain Deed of Title (6.32 acres Home) and then asked if she would 
draw up that agreement however he did not like the wording to her agreement; it put 
all the blame on. (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton Exhibit 8, PTS000662). Defendant 
then stated he would have an agreement drawn up the next day approximately 20 days 
later on August 27, 2002 he provides Agreement, Deed and Disclaimer for 
$21,185.47 for the 6.32 acres as agreed to. But the Agreement was not sign due to 
the Defendant finding a filed complaint dated August 14, 2007 which he added for 
Plaintiff to dismiss complaint within his Settlement Agreement. 
5. Because Plaintiffs Complaint was brought in bad faith, Defendants are entitled to 
their attorney's fees for defending this action. 
Response: Deny 
Plaintiff filed the complaint long after their agreements to compensate her for her 
losses. Defendant did not agree to the wording of Plaintiffs agreement, Holbrook 
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stated that he would draw up the agreement and have to her approximately August 9, 
2007. However Plaintiff never heard from Holbrook. Plaintiff called numerous times 
only to be told Holbrook is out of the office or out of town. Complaint filed August 
14, 2007 in order to protect her rights against the Statute of Limitations. 
6. A Memorandum in support is filed contemporaneously herewith. WHEREFORE, 
Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook request that summary 
judgment be granted in their favor and against Plaintiff on all causes of action 
raised in Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, and that Defendants be awarded 
their attorney's fees due to Plaintiffs bad faith in bringing this action. 
Response: Deny 
Defendants Memorandum for Summary Judgment should not be granted on the 
grounds that there is Material Fact and Defendants' Motion Denied on the grounds of 
Concealment and there are genuine issues for Trial. Defendant should not be awarded 
attorney fees on the grounds that her complaint is bought in good faith. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff did own title to these Deeds; listed below; 
a. Warrant Deed August 27,1993; water rights numbers are listed on deed, 
grazing permits, grazing leases See Affidavit of Tonda Hampton at # 35 
(PTS000428 to PTS000431); 
L Application for Grazing Permit No. GP 21094 
b. Quit Claim Deed August 27, 93 (PTS000432); 
c. Special Warranty Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000433 and PTS000434); 
d. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000435); 
e. Quit Claim Deed May 3,1994 (PTS000436); 
f. Warranty Deed August 1997 (PTS000437); 
2. Defendants did alter her ownership; 
a. Quit Claim Deed dated April 20,1997 and recorded on November 15, 
1999 request of Professional Title Service (see Affidavit of Tonda 
Hampton, Exhibit #19). 
b. Planning & Zoning document dated January 1998 and the legal 
mo 
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description that Defendants failed to recorded a title to document as 
stated in that document which is the cause for a deed to be floating out 
there somewhere, (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton, Exhibit #15). 
3. Due to the fact of Defendants Negligence in their Duty is the cause of that Quit 
Claim Deed dated April 20, 1997 to later appear over two years and seven months (2 
years and 7months) later. The Failure of Defendants to record that title allowed that 
same title and additional several legal descriptions were attached of approximately 
4100 acres and included that May 6, 1998 title consisting of 6.32 acres and House. 
PTS recorded on November 15, 1999. 
4. Therefore defendants are liable for breach of contract, negligence, slander of title, 
and for the fraud discovered within defendants "Defendants provided 427 documents 
(July 9, 2008) (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton, Exhibit #26). 
5. There exist an Oral Agreement due to the meeting of the minds. (See Affidavit of 
Tonda Hampton all documents). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason and upon the grounds set forth in the foregoing memorandum, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Defendant has violated Plaintiffs rights of her Titled ownership to 
thousands of acres when they cause the Error in the Chain of Title by their 
Negligence and other stated in the Third Amended Complaint. 
This is not a case for Summary Judgment because of the facts; 
this court is asked to recognize this case for what it is — a case in which defendant 
Holbrook has agreed to an oral agreement thus, the documents provided during discover 
1 m 
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has exposed the defendants' to mistakes and fraud of the plaintiffs real estate in 
question. Defendant's had no legitimate right to alter ownership of plaintiff s titles 
ownership and then continue to conceal when plaintiflFin 2006 requested certain 
documents. (See Affidavit of Tonda Hampton). 
DATED this o2#day of July, 2009. 
£Tonda Lynn Hampto 
 t n 
Plaintiff 
ProSe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Q(j day of July, 2009,1 caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the going pleading, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
Justin R.Bair (11035) 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ynn Hampton 
Plaintiff 
ProSe 
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ADDENDUM 8 
Affidavit of Tonda Hampton in Support of 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
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TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
P.O.BOX586 
Price Utah 84501 
Tele: (435) 650-3333 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, ( 
Plaintiff, i 
VS. 1 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, 
a corporation 
Defendant; ( 
CLAY G. HOLBROOK an individual ( 
Defendant ( 
[ AFFIDAVIT OF T02SDA LYNN 
{ HAMPTON 
{ Case No.: 070700813 
( Judge: Douglas B. Thomas 
I, Tonda Lynn Hampton, being firs duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years, and am competent to testify in this matter. 
2. I am a named Plaintiff in this matter. 
3. I filed a Complaint dated August 14,2007 against the Defendants in this case. 
a. Clay G. Holbrook, served on December 2007 and; 
b. Professional Title Services on December 2007. 
4. On August 14, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail 
Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter is attached to my 
affidavit as Exhibit 1 (stamped PTS000645). 
5. Due to no response, On September 15,2007,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. 
Holbrook by certified mail Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) 
BLED; 
JUL 2 0 2009 
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Certified Letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 2 (stamped PTS000646 to 
PTS000648). 
6. On September 27, 2007, (Holbrook did call Hampton September 25, 2007 as 
stated in this letter) I sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail again 
Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter is attached to my 
affidavit as Exhibit 3 (PTS000649 to PTS000651). 
7. Due to no response, On October 12, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook 
by certified mail Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter 
is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 4 (PTS000652 to PTS000654). 
8. October 16, 2006, Holbrook contacted Hampton stating "Said lands were sold 
according to the terms of an order of the court entered January 23, 2002. Letter is 
attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 5 (PTS000655). 
9. On November 25, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail 
Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) and stated that I appreciate his 
information stated above in no. 8. Certified Letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 6 
(PTS000656). 
10. On July 23, 2007,1 sent a letter to Holbrook, that I appreciate his concerns about 
the Real estate in question. Holbrook had earlier stopped Hampton in the Court house 
and stated that there is an error in title letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 7 
(PTS000657). 
11. Holbrook arranged a meeting with me at the office of Professional Title Services 
to discuss the title and a compensation to relinquish my rights to that title of 6.32 acres. 
000385 2 
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12. We both agreed to half of $42,060.94 remainder of that what Escrow order of 
$200,000.00. (see affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook exhibit 1 (PTS305 and PTS304). 
13. Holbrook requested that I draw up the Agreement, I did and delivered it to the 
Office of Professional Title Services the Agreement is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 
8 (PTS000662 to PTS000666). 
14. I called several different days to the office to contact Holbrook, but he was gone 
out of the office or out of town. 
15. I made contact to Holbrook by phone, He stated that he did not like my wording 
that it put all the blame on him. 
16. I told him I was sorry, and stated that he would be more experienced to draw up 
an Agreement. 
17. Holbrook said he would get back to me approximately on August 9, 2007. 
18. I did not hear from Holbrook, I called he was either gone or out of town. 
19. I filed an August 14, 2007 complaint in order to protect my rights. But did not 
serve Defendants' in case they kept their Agreement. 
20. I finally reach Holbrook by phone approximately August 27, 2007; He made a 
comment to the effect "That It seems that you have taken different measures" and then he 
mentioned the Complaint that I filed on August 14, 2007. 
21. I told him that the time is of the essence and I had to protect my rights. 
22. Holbrook arranged for me, to come to the office at Professional Title Service to 
settle up. Concerning the 6.32 acre and House and a check for the amount of $21,185.47. 
116 
000386 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
O Q. 
23. I arrived at the office, Holbrook proceeded to give me documents to sign which 
consisted of a Settlement Agreement, Disclaimer and Quit Claim Deed attached to my 
affidavit as Exhibit 9 (PTS000658 to PTS000661). 
24. I had notice that Settlement Agreement, and the terms stating "First Party 
(Hampton) will dismiss, or cause to be dismissed, that certain action filed August 14, 
2007" attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 9 (PTS000658). 
25. I did not sign documents due to the fact of that Settlement Agreement. 
26. Holbrook said he is responsible for the 6.32 acres only and not the rest and 
insisted that I need to reword my complaint and then we will see what can be done 
(regarding that $21,185.47). 
27. Plaintiff did not feel comfortable with Holbrook request and on December 10, 
2007 served each defendant with the August 14, 2007 complaint and Summons. 
28. During the discovery stage, in 2008 defendants produced hundreds of document 
which alerted me to the ownership, the altered documents and certain Deeds filed (and 
not filed) I am trying to make some sense of all this. 
29. At this time Plaintiff believes that Defendants are Liable for her losses of several 
thousands of acres due to admitting error and know through this case defendants continue 
to conceal there actions by filing a Summary Judgment. 
30. Because Defendants altered and concealed true ownership to all of my real estate 
I did not receive my portion of the individual sells, (see Affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook, 
Exhibit 1 and 2 within Memorandum in support of Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment). 
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31. Because Defendants fraudulently concealed a document called a TRUST DEED 
NOTE for $85,000.00,1 did not receive my portion is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 
10(PTS7). 
32. Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and fraudulently concealed the 
misconduct, I did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 600,000.00 attached to 
my affidavit as Exhibit 11 (PTS100 and PTS101). 
33. Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and fraudulently concealed I 
did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 300,000.00 attached to my affidavit: 
as Exhibit 12 (Missing at this time). 
34. Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and continued to fraudulently 
concealed the truth, I did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 125,000.00 
attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 13. 
35. Defendants and I have had several transactions since 1993 that involve several 
parcels of land, water rights, and grazing permits that are deeded to Jensen and Hampton, 
as joint tenant. Deeds are attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 14. 
a. Warrant Deed August 27,1993; water rights numbers are listed on deed, 
grazing permits, grazing leases (PTS000428 to PTS000431); 
i. Application for Grazing Permit No. GP 21094 
b. Quit Claim Deed August 27, 93 (PTS000432); 
c. Special Warranty Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000433 and PTS000434); 
d. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000435); 
e. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000436); 
f Warranty Deed August 1997 (PTS000437); 
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36. In 1997, Planning and Zoning are subdividing out of my Titled to Section 7 that 
has 549.79 acres; which then the 6.32 acres was separated leaving 543.47 acres in section 
7 attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 15 (PTS405 to PTS407). Defendants recorded this 
Certificate of Waiver that is dated January 7, 1998 with the description attached 6.32 
acres and recorded on May 7, 1998. However "This Certificate must be recorded with the 
deed... ."(see at PTS406) there is NO DEED RECORDED which is the cause of a title 
floating around somewhere unknown to me at the time. 
37. Defendants are aware of several loans on the real estate from 1993 to 
approximately 2002; the last pay off attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 16. 
a. August 8, 1997; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres; 
b. August 27, 1997; Jensen and Hampton on Section-7; 549.79 acres; 
c. August 27,1997; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres; 
d. February 26, 1998: Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres; 
38. May 6,1998 Quit Claim Deed to Jensen and Hampton is recorded by Professional 
Title Services on May 7, 1998 with the description of 6.32 acres attached to my affidavit 
as Exhibit 17 (PTS000442 to PTS000443). 
39. Defendants aware of these title reports attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 18. 
a. June 10, 1998; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres (PTS351 to PTS354); 
b. June 10, 1998; Jensen and Hampton on approximately 4,100 acres 
(PTS149tol55); 
This document appears to be altered; Jensen and Hampton interest is replaced with a hand 
written "Double J-see other file", (see at document stamped PTS149) and it appears that 
• 0 0 0 3 8 9 
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632 acres is also listed on this same report with a hand written note stating "Change to 
Foy's legal" (see at document stamped PTS151) and the Green Belt has a note "Replace 
w/ Bk 449 p 534 (see at document stamped PTS155 at #31). 
40. April 20, 1997 Quit Claim deed recorded November 15,1999 by Professional 
Title Serviced (2 years 7 months later) attached is an Exhibit A, which is approximately 
4,100 acres with that 6.32 acres and house Tax ID 2A-1036-L (Jensen and Hampton to 
K.C. Family Limited Partnership) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 19 (PTS000444 to 
PTS000446) and approximately two minutes later; 
41. April 20,1997 Quit Claim deed recorded November 15,1999 by Professional 
Title Serviced also attached is a Exhibit A, which is approximately 4,100 acres with that 
6.32 acres Tax ID 2A-1036-1. (K.C. Family Limited Partnership to Double J Triangle, 
L.L.C) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 20 (PTS000447 to PTS000449). 
42. Approximately 2008, Plaintiff was given a copy of a document dated February 1, 
2000 that was buried in an old filing cabinet that had revealed this letter that states "I 
talked with Clay (Holbrook) and he said that it was included with the other parcel that 
were already changed to double I Triangle Now the application that is on the home 
and the 6.32 acres will have the name Double J Triangle" Signed Francis Price; Carbon 
County Assessor office attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 21 (TLH1). 
43. A document by Holbrook dated On September 11,2002, states "I, Clay G. 
Holbrook, certify that I am licensed as Title Insurance Agent that I have reviewed 
the attached document and have prepared this Report of Water Right Conveyance or that 
it was done under my direct supervision I further certify that the documents attached 
hereto evidence the ownership interest of the current water right owner(s) named in 
Gocmo 7 
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section A; (See PTS311) Section A gives a description of that April 20,1997 Quit Claim 
Deed that was recorded on November 15, 1999 by Professional Title Services (See 
PTS310) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 22. 
44. I also will admit that during all of these transactions especially beginning 1996 to 
the now that I was a battered woman and filed for a Protective Order and a Divorce 
against Jensen I was in Therapy for several years. However the Court found no marriage 
existed and therefore no divorce degree can be granted. The parties have two children 
together at that time were 14 year old and a l l year old. Court did not enter an Order for 
Child Support. 
45. On September 27, 2002, a Review and Order in Case No.: 131094; 154297; 
attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 23 (TLH48-1 to TLH49-1). 
46. History of Hampton cases listed below 6 total. 
1. 994700327 (Abuse case) Filed approximately November 1,1999 with 
Protective Orders in place (Hampton evaluated with (PTSD) post traumatic 
stress syndrome) and as of; 
a. 2002 September 27, Review and Order (TLH48-1) 
i. "Mr. Stubbs reports that mother (Hampton) is making progress 
and the children have improved in school" "Mr. Stubbs 
is recommending continued PSS with the mother"... ."Dr. Elder 
recommends that the boys get to choose how and when they 
visit with father"; 
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ii. "Mr. Golden (defendant attorney) report that the father 
(Jensen) would like visitation or custody. He would like 
Mother to get more help and have DCFS supervise more 
closely"... ."Mother wants protective supervision with DCFS 
continued" (see at middle of page 1). 
iii. ORDER "Protective supervision with custody to the mother is 
continued"; 
iv. "There will be no visits with father except as requested by the 
boys and therapist"; 
v. "The boys are to continue therapy with 4CMH "; 
vi. "There is to be no exchange of the physiological evaluations" 
(seeatpg.2(TLH49-l). 
2. 994700340 (Divorce petition (18 years) Lis Pendens filed November 15, 1999 
Hampton and Jensen, joint tenant on the real estate titles (see def. Mem. Sum. 
Jud. Exh. C). both cases dismissed; Final Court Order dated December 17, 
2002. 
i. Because no marriage exists their can be no divorce decree as 
prayed for."(see def. Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit 1, pg. 6, line 23). 
3. 020701072 (Partnership Dissolution) filed December 18, 2002; Hampton vs. 
Jensen plaintiff also list her titled property as ccProperty known as all of 
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Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah, (see Defendants Mem. 
Sum. Jud. exhibit H (PTS000813), at #1 on doc. PTS-000814). 
4. 030700004 (Partnership Dissolution, Slander, Physical and emotional abuse, 
fraud, and loss of business interest) filed January 6, 2003, Hampton vs. Jensen 
and filed lis pendens. Case dismissed April 25, 2003 "Nevertheless, the Court 
finds under Rule 13(a) URCP, the claim for partnership and dissolution of 
partnership should have been raised in 1999 Common Law Marriage case (see 
Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit IV, document stamped PTS000823). 
5. 034700021 (Paternity Case) Hampton vs. Jensen; Contempt Mr. Jensen in the 
rear on child support and Hampton seeking an order for Child support since 
there was no order issued after the 1999 divorce petition. 
6. 040700256 (Fiduciary Duty) Hampton vs. Jensen Filed April 23, 2004 (see 
Def. Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit M (PTS000973) also state that "The trust 
account no longer exists (see at #5 (PTS000973), Dismissed September 13, 
2006; due to "Rule 8, U.R.C.P., requires that a complaint contain a "short and 
plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and 
"a demand for judgment for the relief' desired. Complaint does not satisfy this 
standard" (See Def Mem. Sum. Jud. exhibit O, at pg. 1 par.2). 
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47. However 2002, January 23, exist a "Stipulation Order" Plaintiff opposes this 
stipulation order on the grounds that it is fraudulent in its real estate claims and water. 
a. In the 1999 case defendant Ex Parte Motion that lead to telephonic 
hearing on that Motion. (See Def Mem. Sum. Jud; exhibit G; pg. 1; stamped 
PTS000481) 
b. "Counsel for both parties, by approving this Order, represent to the 
Court that they do not specialize in real property transactions and that neither counsel 
makes any representations to the Court, any party or any other person regarding the 
property description in this Order: Rather the property descriptions herein are based 
solely on descriptions provided by the real estate brokers or title insurance companies, 
copies of which have been provided to the Court" (see pg. 2 and 3; stamped PTS000482 
&PTS000483at#5. 
c. "The Court notes for the record that counsel for Petitioner (Hampton) 
has made every effort to review this Order with Petitioner, but counsel has been unable to 
reach Petitioner to receive her final approval. Counsel for petitioner believes this Order 
reflects substantially all matters of an earlier version of this Order and on which Counsel 
received Petitioner's agreement see at (PTS000486) at #12. 
d. Two Parcel are ordered to be release from a Lis Pendens; 
(1) Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge and the 6.37 acres on which it is located: 
Tax K)#2A-1036-002, Carbon County, state of Utah, 
and. 
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(2) Approximately 675 Acres west of Helper, Utah: All of Carbon County tax 
ID#2A-1060-0002, containing 428.96 acres more or less. All of the property owned by 
Double J Triangle LLC which is in Carbon County Tax ID#2A-103 8-0000 and 
containing approximately 246 acres. These two parcels contain approximately 675 
acres more or less" (see Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Pg. 3, stamped PTS000483 at #1). 
e. However within the Stipulation Order referring to Tax ID#2A-103 8-
0000 "All of the property owned by Double J Triangle LLC which is in Carbon County 
Tax ED#2A-103 8-0000 and containing approximately 246 acres. These two parcels 
contain approximately 675 acres more or less" (see Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Pg. 3, stamped 
PTS000483at#(2). 
It appears on record that the Tax ID#2A-1038-0000 never did belong to Double J 
Triangle LLC that contains 246 acres. 
The Tax ID#2A-1038-0000 is owned by Carbon County acreage of 0.08 acres attached to 
my affidavit as Exhibit 24 (TLH33-1). 
f. "In addition, two acre feet of water provided from other property owned 
by Double J Triangle is to be included in the sale (see Def. Mem. Sum. Jud. pg. 4, at last 
two line on page (PTS000484). However they never did own the water (see attachment 
22, especially (PTS422 and PTS96) it appears there was pressure to get that water to the 
new owners of that court order sell of that 6.32 acres). 
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i. In addition, Plaintiff is ignorant to how real estate 
descriptions operate but familiar of the loan that is in 
Default for foreclosure and ordered to sell. Holbrook being 
familiar with the real estate would have noticed the above 
mentioned or at some point during title insurance, or title 
research but instead continued to fraudulently conceal. 
48. Plaintiff has transcript word for word of a recording. The recording is of August 
27, 2007 meeting at Professional Title Services with Holbrook and is attached to my 
affidavit as Exhibit 25 (TLH4-1 to TLH15-1). 
49. It appears within Defendants files stamped PTS-1 through PTS-668 there are 
certain altered documents discovered during the Discovery stage Under Rule 26, as of 
2008 plaintiff has tried to review and understand what has happened that wipe her out 
and what is the cause that removed all Hampton, Joint Tenant ownership of several titles 
and all Water Rights and tangibles. 
I have listed a portion in all of the above statements and therefore I Deny allegations 
made by the Defendants Memorandum and Affidavit. 
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50. Defendants Memorandum states "Court had already determined that Plaintiff 
(Hampton) did not have right or title to those properties. Accordingly, Plaintiffs case is 
are barred by the doctrine of res Judicata. (See at Defendants Mem. In Supp. Sum. Jud. at 
pg. 2, at IV. Paragraph 1, line 4). Plaintiff deny this statement. 
51. Defendants Attorney requested documents from those cases one (1) through five 
(5), listed above, at # 46, plaintiff response "Object to the request on the ground that the 
above request does not pertain to this suit" (Def. exh. B, Mem. in Supp. Sum. Jud.). 
52. Defendants never requested the Case No. 040700256 Which now is stated in that 
Motion "However, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in 2004, Fiduciary Duty on Jensen 
which was also dismissed by this Court" (see at pg. ii, par. 2, last 2 lines on pg). 
Plaintiffs states this case is the reason for her to contact Defendants to obtain 
information within a file that Defendants controlled. 
53. I sent First Certified letter on August 14, 2006, to the place of business 
Professional Title Services, located in Price Utah approximately one month before this 
case no. 040700256 was dismissed, then I followed with several more certified letters to 
Defendants to obtain the chain of title. 
53. This Case No. 040700256 was dismissed September 12, 2006.1 was going to 
Appeal but time is now against me. Defendant finally contacted me by phone, September 
25, 2006 after the dismissal. See Plaint. Affid. Exh. 3. 
,14 
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54. I sent again another certified letter dated. Defendant Clay G. Holbrook 
approached me while I was in the Court House in Price, Utah and wanted to meet with 
me. He stated that there had been an error made. 
55. I sent a Letter thanking him for his concern and I cannot meet him on that date we 
discuss earlier. 
56. Meeting of July 2006, the Parties agreed she is Joint tenant on the titles. Clay G. 
Holbrook presented an Escrow document ($200,000.00 House and 6.32 acres) to Plaintiff 
at the offices Professional Title Services. Clay G. Holbrook and Plaintiff agreed to 
compensate her half that she would have been entitled to if not for the error made. 
Defendant admitted that the May 6, 1998 Title is entitled to her (Aff. Of Hampton, 
Exhibit 17). Defendant gave the figure of $21,185.47 from that figure $42,060.94 (see 
Affidavit of Clay Holbrook Exhibit 4). 
57. Also, another Escrow Order ($135,000.00) was given to Plaintiff by Defendant, 
which was also, connected to the sale ($200,000.00) which that Escrow order of 
$200,000.00 paid the commissions of $12,000.00 dollars and the Escrow order for 
$135,000.00 did not (see Affidavit of Clay Holbrook Exhibitl and 2). 
58. Plaintiff can show that an Oral Agreement was in effect, and how Defendants 
later manipulated Plaintiff to release all her titled property, approximately 4,200 acres, 
for the same amount that was agreed upon in an earlier conversation, for that first Escrow 
Order of $200,000.00 dollars, prior to August 14, 2007 file complaint with this Court, for 
that house with 6.32 acres for $21,185.47. 
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59. Defendants5 become aware of a filed complaint dated August 14, 2007 and on 
August 27, 2007 decided to add a Settlement Agreement to the Disclaimer and a Quit 
Claim Deed that was to relinquish Plaintiffs rights to that 6.32 acres and Home which 
would then release all her rights to approximately 4,100 aces. 
60. Defendants did agree to $21,185.47 which is approximately half of her share she 
lost due to the defendants causing a title error that was unknown to Plaintiff at the time of 
the Court order to sell (Sold January 23, 2002) due to a Default Notice on a Bank Loan 
with Plaintiff, Defendants are aware of Plaintiffs Joint Tenants since 1993 and several 
loans on that property. However, during several conversations between Defendants and 
Plaintiff did agree that fraud does exist that involved approximately 4,200 acres. On 
August 27, 2007, Defendant had a different out look on the situation and then stated to 
the Plaintiff that they are not responsible for all, just the 6.32 acres and willing to take 
care of that only. Plaintiff again agreed to what they discuss earlier on that issue but not 
to that new Settlement Statement that was a surprise to her that day. Defendant did not 
up hold his end and of the Oral Agreement that was now in writing by him and causing 
Plaintiff not to sign because of that Settlement Statement. Defendant wanted Plaintiff to 
reword her August 14, 2007 complaint. Plaintiff said she would drop the house and 6.32 
acres and is willing to settle to what was agreed oa However, Plaintiff had to serve 
Defendants5 on December 10, 2007. During these meetings Defendant did not produce 
documents in their file; until June 2008, and is the cause of the third amended complaint 
that now states fraud. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CARBON 
:ss 
1,7erfJ>*l>/K-n \t«w »^«< being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
DATED thisc&7 day of ZfrW , 200?. 
yv 1 pX^ypy e ^ 
SUBSRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^fday ofOkW, 200?. 
My Commission Expires: 
h&lo-lllQfz. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KRISTYPRETTYMAN 
wisunrMMMBBiOFunN 
12 WEST MAIN 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
COMM. EXP. 0547-2012 
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ADDENDUM 9 
Relevant Portions of the Transcript of the Summary Judgment Hearing 
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ORIGINAL 
! 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTJ 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
- 0 O 0 -
DEC14 2009 
IfififflPCT-COURIS. 
Case No. 070700813 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of September, 
2009, commencing at the hour of 10:12 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS B. 
THOMAS, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
\rr O: MMift-
: J : - . V <••' 
DEPOMAXMERIT 
LITIGATION SERVICES 
i-LATEi COObtS 
°&29 2m 
333 SOUTH RIO GRANDE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM GfcCTocrta-qv TOLL. FREE 800-337-6629 PHONE 8011-328-1188 FAX 801-328-1189 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: TONDA LYNN HAMPTON 
Appearing Pro Se 
For the Defendant: JUSTIN R. BAER 
Attorney at Law 
Hirschi, Christensen 
138 East South Temple, 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE COURT: Good morning. We're here on the case of 
Tonda Lynn Hampton vs. Professional Title Service and Stewart 
Title Guaranty and Clay G. Holbrook. We have the petitioner--
plaintiff, who is present. 
Are you prepared to proceed, ma'am? 
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
We also have the defendant, who is present and 
represented by counsel. You are? 
MR. BAER: Justin Baer. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. 
This is the time set for the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, hearing on that motion. 
Are you prepared to proceed as well, Mr. Baer? 
MR. BAER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. You may present your--
MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment requests 
summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims brought in the 
3 
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further lawsuit. And when plaintiff indicated she was going 
to continue the suit and this was only as to one claim, that's 
when the settlement agreement was not completed. And so I 
believe that based on these facts, it can be held that there 
was no meeting of the minds. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. BAER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Ms. Hampton? Go ahead, you can make 
your claim wherever you'd like. 
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, I wrote some notes down, 
so I'll just read them, if I could. 
THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to be listening 
very carefully, you need to respond to the claims that have 
been made by Mr. Baer today. 
MS. HAMPTON: Respond? 
THE COURT: Okay? 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. Should I respond to those now? 
THE COURT: Well, however you want to do it. This 
is your time. I'll--I don't want to dictate to you how you 
must present your claim. 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. On the summary judgment, on the 
requirements, that it needs to be no dispute to the facts, 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the law is properly 
stated and applied. 
And your Honor, this is a case involving the 
13 
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concealment of an error, a mistake. The defendants have 
eliminated joint tenant ownership of 4,200 acres, 
approximately, which are the subject concern in this case. I 
believe defendant only identifies about 681 acres of that, 
which to eliminate, to exclude all real estate, all real 
property issues with present an incomplete picture. 
Since the defendant is not going to move for summary 
judgment on plaintiff's total acreage and other claims, should 
plaintiff total acreage of 4,200 and her allegations be 
excluded, the totality of the circumstances will not be 
presented to the trier of fact. 
Defendant's claim statute of limitations, then res 
judicata. Res judicata is — is based on the case. They're 
applying it to a common law marriage case, the allegations 
within that common law marriage case. 
The plaintiff is not seeking her partnership from 
these defendants, plaintiff is not seeking a divorce from 
these defendants either. Those are allegations in the cause 
of action in the prior cases. 
They claim statute of limitations. And defendant 
statutes three years for plaintiff to file; however, 
defendants claim she filed after the three years and in the 
defendant's claims on July, 2 007, plaintiff questioned two 
parcels of land and that's cited in his facts at Page 10, at 
No. 36; however, plaintiff claims she began on August 14th, 
14 
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2 006, by certifying a letter to Professional Title Service 
addressing one parcel, the 6.32 acres that involved the house, 
real property. That is, both of these statements are within 
one year. 
Defendants did admit an error pertaining to the 
chain of title to that 6.32 acres, the house parcel, that 
involving plaintiff's whole real estate soon will become to 
light during our conversation after 2007 of contact. 
Approximately November of 2 006, Clay Holbrook 
approached myself in this courthouse. Within--anyway, within 
the attachment of plaintiff's res--to the respondent's to 
summary judgment is a transcript. In that transcript, there 
is conversations where the defendant, on Page 8, he included, 
admitted he included the house, he admitted, on Page--
THE COURT: Now, what--what are you referring to, 
now? The--
MS. HAMPTON: My affidavit. 
THE COURT: Okay. You said transcript, that 
wasn't--
MS. HAMPTON: There is a--within the attachment to 
plaintiff's response to the summary judgment of defendant is 
the transcript. There-~that was done on August 27th, 2007, at 
the offices of Professional Title Service with Clay Holbrook. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, are you saying there's a 
transcript of something that's attached to your affidavit? 
15 
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MS. HAMPTON: Yes. It's Exhibit 25. 
THE COURT: Okay. You're talking about the August 
27th, 2007., meeting? 
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And let's just--okay. And what 
is it specifically you're referring to? 
MS. HAMPTON: On Page 6. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: On Page 6 — 1 apologize, these aren't 
numbered, but if you go to the mid-mark and a couple 
paragraphs down, it will have a, "Clay." We were discussing 
the property. 
THE COURT: Just a moment. It says "Clay: (colon) 
We were discussing the property--
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: This is on Page 6; is that correct? 
MS. HAMPTON: Page 6, towards the bottom, it says— 
it's "Clay, you're just releasing u s — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: --because we didn't have—we didn't 
do--we're not capa--culpable on the rest of it." 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: The reason for the meeting was to take 
care of the six acres and receive the twenty-one-plus dollars 
for that, 21,185.47. 
16 
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And then on Page 8,--on Page 8, half-way mark up 
from that is, Clay: We've included the house. 
Through this transcript, he's admitting that he did 
include the house by mistake and that he's not culpable for 
the rest. 
THE COURT: Well, wait a second, ma'am. Where are 
you at? 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. On Page 8, halfway. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm on Page 8. 
MS. HAMPTON: And come up probably four or five or 
six, it will say, "Clay, we included the house," pertaining to 
the error. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: So, he admits — 
THE COURT: Which it says, we included the house and 
that's why. Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: --he included the house and this is 
why he was, at the time and prior to my filing of the 
complaint, he priorly admitted the house for the 21-plus 
dollars. And there's an admission there that he made the 
error and this is what led us to--led to the oral agreement 
prior; but during this meeting, he--he's trying to get out of 
the lawsuit now and we're discussing why we're to take care of 
the house only and leave the other issues for the court to 
decide. 
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THE COURT: And where does he say that the 
settlement agreement is clear for that, ma'am? That's what 
I'm looking for. Is that the settlement agreement only 
applies to the house. 
MS. HAMPTON: The settlement agreement, the reason 
why I could not complete our oral agreement, the--on the 6.32 
acres for the—for the money amount to exchange and relinquish 
my rights, during that meeting, I did read all the documents 
and noticed the settlement--settlement agreement was attached 
and because of that reason, I could not finish my obligations 
either. 
THE COURT: Well, ma'am, what I'm trying to find out 
here--
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: —your—what is the nature of the 
settlement agreement that you believe, what are the terms of 
the settlement agreement that you believe? You thought it was 
just for the six-point-some-odd acres? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. 
THE COURT: What did you think the settlement 
agreement was for? 
MS. HAMPTON: When I read the settlement agreement, 
I realized he had found the complaint that I filed and he 
added that to our oral agreement, but the oral agreement was 
like way before August 8th, but on August 27th, apparently, he 
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found the August 14th complaint and I believe the settlement 
agreement was attached. If I didn't read that, I wouldn't be 
here today. I read that and I was totally shocked to see a 
settlement agreement of that; why in the world would I agree 
to turn over 4,2 00 acres for a lousy twenty-one thousand-plus 
dollars? That was never talked about, never mentioned through 
an agreement to settle the house. 
THE COURT: Well, but ma'am, what it has to do with 
you is your claims against Mr. Holbrook. 
MS. HAMPTON: Uh huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: And so the question is, is, did you 
believe you were relinquishing all of your claims against Mr. 
Holbrook as of that date? Were you relinquishing everything 
against Mr. Holbrook in exchange for the twenty-one thousand? 
MS. HAMPTON: Not in the oral agreement. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HAMPTON: We only--we never discussed 4,200 
acres prior. The oral agreement only was a discussion of six 
point acres for the $21,000. That was the oral agreement; 
however, so many weeks later, he had found that I filed the 
suit, 'cause I had realized that all of this was connect—now 
connected and I could find that there was a big mistake. And 
when I filed suit, because of his avoidance, of not keeping up 
the oral agreement on a certain date, I applied--I--I filed 
the complaint. But on August 27th, he called me in to take 
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care of the oral agreement. 
THE COURT: And he was saying, I want everything 
taken care of on—for the payment of 21,000? 
MS. HAMPTON: As I read through, what I thought I 
was signing off was just six acres for the $21,000, all of a 
sudden, I seen an attached document called settlement 
statement agreement and was concerned why he is now applying 
this. This was not part of our oral agreement discussion, 
which I believe he attached it because he found the complaint 
and thought this was a quick way, if I didn't read it, he'd 
slip right through. 
THE COURT: So, the transcript that you have 
attached— 
MS. HAMPTON: Uh huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: --just so we're straight on this, are 
you suggesting that's a complete transcript of the settlement 
meeting? 
MS. HAMPTON: This happened--yes, this is a complete 
transcript of that one day, when I realized— 
THE COURT: Of the August 27th one? 
MS. HAMPTON: Of the August 27th— 
THE COURT: But after that, you'd already filed. 
So, this is the one where it broke down, basically where you 
realized that he was wanting to settle more, but this was not 
your original discussion transcript? 
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MS. HAMPTON: This was not our original agreement, 
no, which was an oral agreement for the house only. 
And then when I had typed up an agreement, he didn't 
like my wording and it was for the house, for the 21,000 and 
then, I asked him to do it and then, he never came around the 
next day, days go by, I get concerned because I don't know 
about an oral agreement, if it's a one-year statute of 
limitation, I protected my rights and I filed that complaint 
immediately. Did not serve him, in case he was to continue to 
take care of--of his obligation, compensate for his error. 
But on August--
THE COURT: So, you wanted to collect the $21,000 
and then still turn around and sue him for the 4,200 acres? 
Is that essentially--
MS. HAMPTON: We--
THE COURT: --what you wanted to do? 
MS. HAMPTON: --we had discussed all of this prior 
to August 27th. Both of us had realized there was a big 
error, I did not receive any documents; however, the 
defendants avoided giving me any documents, but stated, we'll 
take care of one--basically, we'll take care of the house 
first. And that's why I came down August 27th, to take care 
of the house. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, what I'm trying to find out is, 
what do you believe the terms were of this settlement 
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agreement? And what is — 
MS. HAMPTON: In the oral — 
THE COURT: —and what do you base those terms on? 
MS. HAMPTON: --in the oral — 
THE COURT: I'm trying to find out whether there was 
a meeting of the minds on that settlement—proposed settlement 
agreement. 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. The oral agreement, we had 
meeting of the minds, it was, just, he had to draw up the 
document 'cause he didn't like mine. 
THE COURT: Okay. What were the terms, do you 
believe? 
MS. HAMPTON: The terms were to—I would relinquish 
my rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed 
up, everything was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in 
that August 27th disclaimer, I believe would be correct, to my 
belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer. Those are the 
terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title 
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, wait a second here. Do 
you— 
MS. HAMPTON: Those— 
THE COURT: --have you attached that document? 
MS. HAMPTON: It's in def endant' s — 
THE COURT: Okay. But you're saying that that 
22 
1AA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
document was accurate? 
MS. HAMPTON: The disclaimer is accurate. He had 
typed up, for the 6.32 acres, that was accurate. But the 
trick, and I can't find another word for it, was, he attached 
settlement statement agreement that we never once discussed, 
prior. 
THE COURT: Well, so, ma'am, when you say the 
disclaimer agreement, I — I'm trying to sort out what it is 
you're talking about. You need to help me out here and refer 
to me exactly what it is you're referring to, because this is 
the critical issue for me, is whether or not— 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: -—there is a reasonable basis to find 
there is a disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral 
contract. And—and I'm looking to see what you believed the 
terms of the oral contract were and where that—where that 
document is--is--why you believe those terms are accurate, the 
basis for what you believe those terms are. 
MS. HAMPTON: The basis, he agreed to pay the money 
to relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the 
company erred in. I don't believe I have the--a document to 
show that at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, there's no document that 
shows what the terms of that agreement were; is that correct? 
MS. HAMPTON: Not at this time— 
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THE COURT: Well, this is--
MS. HAMPTON: --to show--
THE COURT: --the time, ma'am, there's not any other 
time. This is the now. Do you have an agreement that shows 
the existence of those terms? 
MS. HAMPTON: Defendants typed up the agreement, I 
don't have that agreement, but it did not match--the August 
27th meeting was totally changed to our terms of an oral 
agreement, to relinquish my rights of six acres only for 
$21,000, which was an escrow order that they erred in. That 
is an oral agreement and since that did not ever happen, I had 
to file a complaint to save my rights for trial. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, what do you--what do you believe 
the term--what are you asserting the terms were of the oral 
agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: When you say "terms", could you— 
THE COURT: Yeah. In other words, the terms of a 
contract would be, you know, the--the things that go to the 
heart of the agreement. In other words, there would be a 
payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand some-odd dollars 
in exchange for what? What--what--what were the terms of the-
-of the oral agreement from your perspective? 
MS. HAMPTON: He would pay me the $21,185.47 to 
relinquish my rights to a deed of 6.32 acres. That was a 
discussion and an agreement we came to. 
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THE COURT: So, it was—it was totally to relinquish 
rights to a deed? That's all it was? 
MS. HAMPTON: To relinquish my rights to a deed, one 
deed of 6.32 acres. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, essentially, your oral 
agreement was the payment would be made to relinquish the 
rights in land. Is that what you're--
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: --is that what you're telling me? 
MS. HAMPTON: It was land, real property. 
THE COURT: So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it 
was not in the nature of a settlement agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. 
THE COURT: It was not in the nature of a settlement 
agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. The--
THE COURT: But rather was for payment for an 
interest in land. Is that what you're asserting? I want to 
make sure I understand this, ma'am. 
MS. HAMPTON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
Go ahead. 
MS. HAMPTON: And go back to—I'm not sure I left 
off, the statute of limitations, defendant's claim. And back 
to the defendants did admit an error pertaining to the chain 
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of title that involved the 6.32 acres. He admitted that on 
November, 2 0 06. 
The defendant never did supply their findings to--to 
myself and how they came up and acknowledged the error; 
however, all the above statements are within a three-year 
statute of limitation and therefore, it cannot be artificially 
separated from the overall claims and the newly--newly 
discovered evidence. The defendant's method used demonstrates 
their wrong involve (sic) for—for an example, defendant's 
claim on the two-parcel house and the vacant, which is 6.32 
acres and 675 acres, that sold—did sell in 2002, which that 
total acreage is 681 acres-. That leaves 3,400 acres that are 
at issue as well. 
I will — the continuance of the wrong--of the error 
of the title company as of 2000--2008, all of the real estate 
has now sold in different sections and I'm still gathering 
documents on that. 
The last portion—portion of property was a hundred 
acres that sold for 125,000. Again, my name was not attached 
to my titles when it sold and that came to my attention during 
the year, I think it was closer to 2008, February; however, 
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of 
limitations. As a result, during discovery stage, defendants 
produced hundreds of documents, nine hundred-plus, at 
different days and times, is when I discovered the chain of 
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title error in the year 2008, involving all of the Carbon 
County real property. 
The evidence for trial is now in black and white. 
The alterations of certain documents within the defendant's 
files is concealed, was not even available public records. 
In short, your Honor, on a summary judgment motion 
or the jury should make one determination as a result of the 
'defendant's actions that involve all the plaintiff's real 
estate, property, due to their error and. continued actions to 
conceal, misrepresent, mislead myself. What I mean by that 
is, in 2007, he agreed to start paying for his errors, 
compensate, starting with the 6.32 acres that was just 
discussed. 
THE COURT: Well, but~~but ma'am, that's what I just 
asked about. You said that, when he agreed to pay, he was just 
paying you for the deed, that was--I asked you that 
specifically, whether that was in the nature of a settlement 
agreement or whether that was for the purchase of the land. 
And you indicated that it was for the deed. 
MS. HAMPTON: There is an existing deed, today, that 
said I have ownership of that 6.32 acres. There is a deed 
right now that I have, but—however, because of the chain of 
title, it really doesn't exist. This is why he wanted that 
deed in exchange for the $21,000, to cover up the error. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, I — I'm still trying to focus 
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down--come back to this $21,000. 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: And--and you have told me that what you 
were paying the $21,000 for was essentially--or he was paying 
the $21,000, was for you to relinquish your rights in the 
property, that it in essence was not as—in fact, I asked you 
specifically, was it a settlement agreement? You said no, it 
was not, it was for the rights to the property and that deed. 
Is that correct? 
MS. HAMPTON: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. HAMPTON: And I'm not sure if any law warrants 
their actions for concealment, but all of the issues for years 
have been totally concealed, never exposed, never once, no one 
came to me and said, hey, there was an error. Through all of 
my research, continuing, trying to find the error, and then 
now this suit, is the only time I received any documents from 
the files is through the discovery stage, to expose what 
really happened. And the doctrine of fraudulent concealment 
will toll the statute to where the defendant, if they did 
conceal, mislead, should be applied. 
And was there any other questions that I haven't 
answered? 
THE COURT: I don't believe so, ma'am. Thank you. 
Mr. Baer? 
28 
150 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. BAER: Your Honor, if I may, just one more point 
regarding this oral agreement. Paragraph 12 of Ms. Hampton's 
affidavit, it's on Page 3 of her affidavit, she says, We both 
agreed to half of 42,000, approximately, the remainder of what 
escrow order of 200,000. 
Paragraph 13, Holbrook requested that I draw up the 
agreement, I did, and delivered it to the office of 
Professional Title Services. The agreement is attached to my 
affidavit as Exhibit 8. 
Exhibit 8 to her affidavit has a Bate stamp of 
PTS662. 
So, the document that was provided to the defendant 
by plaintiff is titled Settlement Agreement, it references 
this 6.32 acres and then has a general irelease at the end, 
Paragraph 2, called release. Hampton hereby completely 
releases, acquits, forever discharges Professional Title 
Services. 
And so, when they met on August 27th, the defendant 
had discovered this lawsuit and wanted the lawsuit dismissed 
as part of the agreement and she said, this agreement is only 
for the six acres. 
So, this—this document that was prepared by the 
plaintiff demonstrates that it was a settlement of disputed 
claims. And so, when the defendant discovered that there was 
a lawsuit, she was planning on proceeding with a lawsuit, 
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that's, I believe the facts in evidence demonstrate that there 
was no meeting of the minds regarding this agreement. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. BAER: Thank you. 
MS. HAMPTON: Could I respond to that? 
THE COURT: If you have something to respond to 
that, ma'am, I'll let you. Go ahead. 
MS. HAMPTON: On that agreement he refers to--
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
MS. HAMPTON: —of the 6.32 acres was at the time of 
my knowledge of the error in that property, the other wasn't 
discussed or realized until further investigation of the total 
acreage, which then, on August 14th is when I decided I needed 
to file a complaint, because this involved more than 6.32 
acres. But that agreement that I'd drawn up was prior to my 
knowledge of all acreage and even pointing the finger at the 
defendants, which would relinquish the rights to that 6.32 
acres for that dollar amount, that was all that was in that 
document, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
I have reviewed very carefully the pleadings the 
parties have filed. In my mind, I did have a question with 
respect to the existence of a dispute regarding the terms of 
an oral contract; however, I believe those issues have been 
resolved in my mind at today's hearing. 
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Let me indicate my thinking on that. With respect 
to all of the underlying claims, these have--the--the 
defendant has shown in the briefing that these claims 
essentially have all had an opportunity to be litigated in--in 
prior actions. And--and the reason why that becomes important 
is whether or not it's been determined whether or not the 
plaintiff had any interest in those properties, and if she had 
no interest in those properties because they were previously 
extinguished in prior litigation, then in fact, she would have 
no basis to come back to Professional Title Services for their 
work. 
So, for the reasons set forth in the defendant's 
memoranda, I do find that the doctrine of res judicata does, 
in fact, apply and I am persuaded by that. 
Similarly, I also believe the, as a separate 
grounds, I also believe the statutes of limitations arguments 
apply. 
The big question in my mind had to do, as I've 
i 
indicated, with the existence of an oral contract. And the 
question in my mind is whether or not there was an oral 
contract or a settlement agreement in which the parties now 
are disputing the terms, or whether, in fact, it was some 
other form of agreement. 
The plaintiff has, today, clarified for the Court in 
her testimony in response to my questioning, on numerous 
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occasions—numerous occasions, that she believed that she was 
purchasing, essentially--or she wasn't purchasing, she was 
surrendering an interest in real estate through that oral 
contract. And that, in fact, the money would be paid and the 
deed would be conveyed. 
I believe that that argument is barred by the 
statute of frauds, specifically Utah Code Annotated Section 
25-5-1. No estate or interest in real property other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, and that's not what 
we're dealing with here, nor any trust or power over 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law or by deed or 
conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating, 
.granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
It appears to me that what we've got is the 
plaintiff now asserting that she was conveying an interest in 
property in a deed in exchange for the twenty-one thousand. 
As a consequence, that is a contract for the sale of property, 
sale of land. By law, it is required to be in writing, there 
cannot be an oral--an oral enforcement of that claim or an 
oral contract for that claim. 
So, as a consequence, the Court finds that her claim 
for an oral agreement for sale of land is, in fact, 
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unenforceable as a matter of law and barred by the Utah 
statute of frauds contained in 25-5-1. 
As a consequence, the Court cannot find that there 
was any oral contract of settlement; in fact, in—as I 
questioned--or a dispute regarding the contract of settlement; 
and in fact, as I questioned the plaintiff as to whether there 
was an—a contract for settlement that was at issue, she 
specifically indicated no. 
Accordingly, I'm granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment in full and would ask Mr. Baer to please 
correct the--prepare the paperwork and to please include the 
analysis that's utilized under the separate claims as part of 
the Court's justification for the order, because I am, in 
fact, adopting those as separate, independent justifications 
for granting the motions for summary judgment. 
MS. HAMPTON: . Your Honor, is that the final? 
THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. 
MS. HAMPTON: What about the concealed fraud 
argument in the third complaint? 
THE COURT: Ma'am, I — I have—I have issued my 
ruling today. When you say the concealed fraud argument, my 
point here, ma'am, is that your interest has already been 
extinguished as against—in these properties in prior 
litigation. 
MS. HAMPTON: Excuse me. They weren't extinguished, 
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they were fraudulently concealed and erred in title--
THE COURT: But they were--they were presented 
before a Court--
MS. HAMPTON: No, they were not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I—again, I'm going through the 
information that has been provided and the documents that were 
provided by the defendant in this case and it would appear 
that they were in fact, that--
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, they're incomplete 
documents and hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, but, ma'am, are you suggesting 
that there--the prior court orders have not in fact ruled on 
these claims? 
MS. HAMPTON: They did not rule on my property 
issues, they ruled on a common law marriage and I--
THE COURT: But as part of that common law marriage, 
they, in fact, issued a--an appropriate property decree in 
terms of allocating the division of property, did they not? 
Mr. Baer, am I wrong on that? 
MR. BAER: I believe that they did and following 
lawsuits in 2002, '3 and '4, also adjudged those claims. 
THE COURT: Yeah. There were also additional claims 
in those later lawsuits, were there not, having to do with 
these properties, as I read your--
MR. BAER: Yes, there were. 
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THE COURT: --briefs and as I read the orders on 
those later claims. 
MS. HAMPTON: That is not true, your Honor, it's 
incomplete documents and they're alluding off findings of fact 
and it does not state facts. It will state the common law 
marriage and I'm not entitled to my partner, which was my ex-
husband, I'm not entitled to his portion of the property. 
That does not say that I cannot have my joint tenant property. 
This is joint tenant property in discussion, those titles are-
-are joint property. 
THE COURT: But—but ma'am, but ma'am, were they-~I 
want to give you every opportunity here, I don't want to cut 
you off, but I'm suggesting to you that, as I reviewed the 
defendant's motion and memorandum supporting motion for 
summary judgment, specifically, ultimately, the Court 
dismissed plaintiff's 1999--well,* let's get down to the 
statement of undisputed fact. Okay. 
We have all of those facts that have been listed and 
I would point out, ma'am, that you have not met your burden 
that is required in terms of responding appropriate to the— 
appropriately, as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to 
these--to these affi~-or to these statements of fact. 
MS. HAMPTON: On who? Prior cases? 
THE COURT: No, ma'am, as required for you to 
respond to the memorandum in support of motion for summary 
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judgment, specifically the statement of undisputed fact. 
MS. HAMPTON: Is that these defendants? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. HAMPTON: What if I agree to all of them? 
THE COURT: You agreed to every one of these facts. 
MS. HAMPTON: Okay. So, I agreed to them, your 
Honor, but, however, that's not the issues of this case, that 
is not the subject matter or the issues to this case. Those 
prior cases involved a divorce, just a divorce, and the final 
ruling was that no common law exist and the next is release 
lis pendens. Those lis pendens were on joint property. It 
never did say all the property goes to the defendant, any 
defendant, in any of those prior cases. They claim res 
judicata on marriage and I'm not entitled to the defendant's 
portion, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you will — I'm going to let you, 
Counsel, kind of go through and--and let's kind of summarize 
this for her so she has a good understanding, I want to give 
her every opportunity with respect to these statement of 
facts, because as I went through, I was--I was persuaded that 
in fact, there was no statement of fact with respect to these 
parcels of property because they had, in fact, been resolved 
through prior litigation. 
Counsel? 
MR. BAER: Your Honor, Exhibit M to the defendant's 
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memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment is a 
complaint filed in 2004. There are the allegations of this 
complaint, Paragraph 5, I, plaintiff, on information and 
belief, allege the defendant, who is Kim Jensen and Mr. 
Jensen's attorney, has a breach of fiduciary duty. The trust 
account regarding an interest-bearing account of this 2 002 
sale no longer exists. 
And then she goes on, I believe my joint partner 
defendant has now sold all of our other Carbon County real 
estate as of approximately 2 004, once deeded in both 
plaintiff's and defendant's names, approximately 3,200 acres. 
The record will show that somehow a limited liability company 
sold our real estate interests. 
Paragraph 10, defendant's true records will show 
that petitioner was never given any oral or written documents 
to allow any ownership change on approximately 4,000 acres, 
which are at issue. 
And--and so this, I believe that this complaint, the 
2 004 complaint, it summarizes, because then there's a motion 
to dismiss based on res judicata that walks through the 
previous lawsuits attached as various complaints and the order 
from the Court does say that these issues were previously 
adjudicated. 
THE COURT: And—and that, essentially, is what— 
where my focus has been, ma'am. Again, it goes to the fact of 
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whether or not you had any right, title and interest in this 
property. You can't go against the title company if you have 
no right, title and interest as determined by prior court 
order. And it would appear to me that these interests have 
been determined by prior court orders in your litigation with 
Mr. Jensen. 
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, I have no interest to the 
portion of Mr. Jensen's property in the common law divorce 
case. He had no right to my portion either. 
THE COURT: But ma'am, the—what I'm suggesting to 
you is that those prior cases have resolved the issue of who 
owned the property. 
MS. HAMPTON: I do not see a court—final court 
order, judgment, saying that my property, joint property is to 
go to Mr. Jensen. 
THE COURT: Well, what I'm suggesting to you is, it-
-it appears to me that the issue of these lands, okay, the 
property and these lands has previously been decided, this 
real property has previously been decided in prior litigation 
and--and that, I believe, is what Mr. Baer was referring to. 
Did that not have to do with litigation surrounding these 
properties? 
MR. BAER: Yes, it did. 
MS. HAMPTON: The litigation was that the defendant, 
Kim Jensen, did not want his portion separated, half to me, 
38 
160 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Those were what litigated and they--you don't have a full 
document or--of the case to show all that. The final order 
doesn't state in detail any of that property--
THE COURT: But it dismissed your claims to those 
properties, ma'am, I believe. 
Did it not, Counsel? 
MR. BAER: Yes. 
THE COURT: It--it--in other words, it conclusively 
dismissed your claims to the properties, by conclusively 
dismissing your claim, your assertion to that property, ma'am, 
it means that you did not have any right, title or interest to 
those properties. 
MS. HAMPTON: This is why I went to the Professional 
Title Service, to find out why. The case of 2004, that was 
served in September, 2 004, finally in 2006 was dismissed 
because somebody kept telling me I have no interest, so I 
contacted Clay Holbrook. This is where we started to have 
agreements. 
THE COURT: But--but what I'm suggesting to you, 
ma'am, is that your time to litigate that claim, okay, if you 
believed that you had a right, title and interest underlying 
to that property, your claim--your time to litigate that claim 
was back in those prior lawsuits. You were dismissed out, 
'cause that--you had made those claims to those parcels of 
property and the Court found that you—and dismissed your 
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lawsuit and essentially found that you had no right, title or 
interest to those parcels. 
Now, that's my understanding of those prior cases. 
If I'm wrong, Mr. Baer, please correct me. 
MR. BAER: That's my understanding as well. 
THE COURT: So, essentially, ma'am, if you--if a 
Court has previously ruled that you have no right, title or 
interest to those properties, if you have no right, title or 
interest to those properties as established by a prior court 
order, then those issues are settled. You can't turn around 
and then sue Mr. Holbrook on an underlying claim that you do 
have a right, title and interest, when a court has already 
determined that you have no such right, title or interest to -
the property. 
MS. HAMPTON: Mr. Jensen claimed in those complaints 
that I did not have a right to his interest. I don't see a 
document where it says I do not--I don't have right to title. 
THE COURT: I believe, ma'am, that's what those 
cases were about. 
MS. HAMPTON: I don't.see those documents— 
THE COURT: That's--
MS. HAMPTON: --right to title. 
THE COURT: That's—it's my understanding, ma'am, 
that in fact, your claims to those properties were, in 
essence, distinguished. Now, do the orders specify, Mr. Baer, 
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are you aware of--as to whether she was awarded any right, 
title or interest in those properties? 
MR. BAER: She was not. My understanding of those 
lawsuits was there were very similar allegations to this suit, 
the ones that I read in that 2 000 suit--2 004 suit, were 
regarding transferring properties out of her name and 
fraudulently concealing different types of things and those 
cases were all ruled against her. 
THE COURT: And that was my understanding as I 
reviewed them and reviewed--went through all of them. I just 
wanted to make sure that my understanding is--is accurate. 
Ma'am, it appears to me that those claims have all 
been made, you've already gone through substantial litigation 
on those claims. 
MS. HAMPTON: The only part was the common law, 
there was a lis pendens put on my property to protect it, the 
very first one was my interest property. Because of the fraud 
and I pled fraudulent doctrine--the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment is what led me to Mr. Holbrook. I was unaware of 
the fraud that was committed and that tolls the-statutes, even 
if it's nine, ten, twenty years later, it tolls the statutes 
when there's concealed fraud. This is what's happened through 
all of these litigations and never once did this company come 
to me and tell me, there's an error, this property is being 
sold, I'm doing title research, there's an error. That was 
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all concealed from everybody. 
I don't see a court order specifically saying that 
my title I have no interest to. 
THE COURT: But quite frankly, ma'am, that is not 
before me today. That issue's not before me; in other words, 
this is not a quiet title action. 
MS. HAMPTON: No. 
THE COURT: This—this is an action against Mr. 
Holbrook. 
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And essentially, what I have done 
is, I've found against you on your claims against Mr. 
Holbrook. 
MS. HAMPTON: For him concealing in his error? 
THE COURT: I — I have—I have found, based upon the 
fact that those issues had already been resolved, that--that 
the--that the issues that you have litigated in this case were 
substantially litigated in prior—in prior cases. 
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, I believe that's false. I 
had never once, and if it was, I wouldn't be here today, 
because it would have been resolved with those issues. It was 
totally hidden and concealed. This is an issue of fraud 
against a title company, not going from a common law marriage 
and after my ex-husband's portion of the joint property, 
that's not--
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THE COURT: But, ma'am--
MS. HAMPTON: --what's litigated. 
THE COURT: But ma'am, there was later litigation 
other than the common law marriage. 
MS. HAMPTON: 2004, there was suspicion of fraud, I 
didn't know how to get it. 
THE COURT: But it was—it was alleged at that time, 
ma'am, and it was dismissed, the claim was raised, you raised 
the claim and the case was dismissed at that time. You cannot 
turn around and raise the same claims later in a different 
litigation. 
MS. HAMPTON: I tried, through that litigation, 
through the 2004, the dismissal of 2006, I tried to obtain 
documents from the title company, certified letter sent 
several times, avoidance. That's concealment. Avoidance. He 
did not produce; however, they dismissed, this is when he 
entered and say, I will take care of it, there is an error, I 
figured he was, by now, I know he was avoiding, 'cause I could 
have appealed it— 
THE COURT: But--but ma'am--
MS. HAMPTON: --he prevented me a cause of action. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, I--I'm convinced that I've—I'm. 
persuaded by the defendant's arguments in this case. I 
believe that you did have an opportunity in that prior 
litigation to raise those claims and in fact, did raise those 
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claims--
MS. HAMPTON: I was prevented--
THE COURT: —in the prior litigation. 
MS. HAMPTON: —your Honor. 
THE COURT: You--you did, in fact, raise those 
issues at that time, ma'am, and so I'm simply suggesting that 
for the reason that it has already been decided and further, 
that the statute of limitations has run, I am granting the 
motion for summary judgment as presented by the defendant in 
their--
MS. HAMPTON: Even on fraudulent concealment 
doctrine? 
THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. I--I am, on that, because I 
believe those documents do in fact show that you were making 
similar claims back in that prior litigation. You're 
indicating that you couldn't find things back then, but the 
point is, is, you should have moved forward in that prior 
litigation to obtain that information. 
MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, in that last one, it was 
pertaining to 601--81 acres, an interest-bearing trust account 
that was gone. That's what that case was about. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, thank you for coming today and 
that'll be the order of the Court. 
Would you prepare the order, Mr. Baer? 
MR. BAER: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 
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n 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. HAMPTON: Thanks, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you both for coming today. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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